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Over the last twelve years, the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware has experienced exponential growth in the
number of bankruptcy filings for large corporate debtors. This
relatively recent rise in Delaware bankruptcy venue cannot, on its
face, be explained by Delaware's eighty-five-year preeminence in the
race for corporate charters, since the advantages most often
postulated for Delaware's dominance in corporate law do not carry
over to corporate bankruptcy. The state has limited influence over
federal bankruptcy law and virtually no control over the selection of
federal bankruptcy judges.1
This rise of Delaware bankruptcy venue, or Delawarization of
bankruptcy, has drawn widespread criticism of the current
bankruptcy venue provision, which, since 1978, has permitted a
corporate debtor to file in either its "principal place of business" or its
2
place of incorporation.
1.
Delaware has been the preferred location for chartering large, publicly held companies
since it wrested this crown from New Jersey in 1917. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6 (1993). Federal bankruptcy judges are selected by the United
States courts of appeals for the circuit in which they sit. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
2.
The actual language of the bankruptcy venue provision in title 28 of the U.S. Code
states that a bankruptcy case may be filed in the United States district court for the district:
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States,
or principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the subject of
such case have been located for the one hundred and eighty days immediately
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such one-hundred-andeighty-day period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such person were located in
any other district; or
(2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person's affiliate,
general partner, or partnership.
§ 1408. Courts interpreting § 1408 have construed the "domicile" of a corporation to be its "place
of incorporation." See, e.g., In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988)
(Balick, B.J.) (holding that a corporation's "residence or domicile," for purposes of bankruptcy
venue, is its place of incorporation).
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Although the Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy has
raised alarm, no one has analyzed the motives underlying the actions
of the parties that produced this curious development. To determine
whether Congress should pass an "anti-Delaware" amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code, we need to know why this development is taking
place. This Article attempts to unravel the mystery by exploring the
explanations proffered by the key decisionmakers: debtors' counsel,
creditors' counsel, and bankruptcy judges. I have talked with over fifty
lawyers and judges and have assembled their often-unexpected
explanations for the Delaware bankruptcy phenomenon, as well as
their forecasts for the future of Delawarization.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I provide a
chronological and factual account of the Delawarization of corporate
bankruptcy and detail the normative positions that have been staked
out by proponents and critics of the development. In-Part II, I present
my findings with regard to the explanations provided by debtors' and
creditors' counsel and the factors that they believe drive the choice of
the District of Delaware. In Part III, I look at the "supply side" of the
jurisdictional competition equation, surveying the opinions of
bankruptcy and other judges as to why a court might participate in a
competition for cases. In Part IV, I analyze these explanations in light
of the literature on jurisdictional competition in order to determine
whether the Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy is a desirable
development.
The responses of lawyers and judges suggest that there are
critical differences between the jurisdictional competition that Roberta
Romano refers to as the "genius of American corporate law" and the
type of competition that we have witnessed in bankruptcy over the
last twelve years. 3 Unlike the jurisdictional competition that
characterizes the corporate charter race, the evidence presented here
suggests that the Delawarization of bankruptcy is the product of an
entirely different form of competition. This competition, which I term
"professional competition," can be defined as a contest between
professionals to provide more and better service to those in need of
their expertise, and without regard to tangible compensation for
superior service. In Part V, I explore the concept of professional
competition and demonstrate that the Delawarization of bankruptcy
venue is more accurately understood as a contest between
professionals driven by the psychic income they derive in the form of
prestige, recognition, and satisfaction for the excellent discharge of
their duties.
3.

ROMANO, supra note 1, at 1.
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Part V concludes with an exploration of the untapped potential
of professional competition between judges and the various ways in
which bankruptcy venue might be reformed to capture its benefits. Of
the various approaches explored, two appear to be most promising.
First, bankruptcy judges might sit at large, in much the same manner
as national arbitrators, with debtors selecting the most competent and
efficient judges available at the time of filing. Judges might then
travel to hear each particular case in the forum most convenient for
the parties. These at-large judges might even operate through "atlarge courts," with judges selecting and training their successors in
much the same manner as law firms and university faculties.
Professional competition might even suggest a move toward private
bankruptcy judges. Second, states might reemerge as the locus of
reorganization law, a position they once enjoyed in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. This reemergence might foster
jurisdictional
competition
between
various
reorganization
mechanisms, many of which have been presented by critics of the
current Chapter 11 process over the past decade. 4 It is also possible
that the reemergence of jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy
might be inconsistent with, and perhaps undermine, the relatively
untapped form of competition we currently witness between
professionals. All reforms are likely to be resisted by the State of
Delaware, however, in large part because of their collateral effects on
that state's position atop the corporate charter race.
An introductory note about methodology and exposition is in
order. The explanations presented in this Article were compiled
through interviews with over thirty bankruptcy lawyers, several
United States Trustees, and more than a dozen judges, although some
of the explanations offered by judges were in response to a short
questionnaire. Many of the interviews and informal conversations
were conducted during the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
Annual Meeting in Orlando, Florida, from October 16 to October 18,
2001, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's
Section on Business Law in Boston on April 4, 2002. Surveys were
circulated in December 2001 and January 2002. Many of the
explanations offered by bankruptcy and other judges interviewed in
this study mirrored those offered by lawyers. For purposes of analysis,
4.
See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,
36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebehuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model
for CorporateReorganization,83 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1983).
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however, the explanations bearing on lawyer motives are presented
first, followed by the explanations offered by judges with regard to the
judicial mind-set.
I. THE RISE OF DELAWARE BANKRUPTCY
While Delaware has long been the jurisdiction of choice for the
filing of corporate charters, the state's preeminence as a bankruptcy
haven is a recently acquired one. A corporation or entity considering a
Chapter 11 filing may be confronted with a number of venue choices.
Delaware became an option beginning in 1978, when a business was
permitted to file its petition in the district where it is incorporated. 5
Prior to 1990, most bankruptcy cases were brought in the district
where the debtor had its principal place of business. 6 When a venue
other than the principal place of business was sought for a complex
bankruptcy case, the Southern District of New York was the preferred
7
venue throughout the 1980s.
In 1990, one case changed everything. Continental Airlines was
confronting the possibility of bankruptcy for the second time in two
years.8 Instead of filing in Houston, where the company was
headquartered and where it had previously filed a Chapter 11
petition, Continental's lawyers chose to file in Delaware. 9 The success
of Continental's second reorganization captured the imagination of
bankruptcy attorneys around the country. By 1993, 40% of Chapter 11
cases involving large, publicly traded debtors were filed in Delaware. 10
By 1996, the District of Delaware had become the venue for 86% of
these cases. 1 As of 2001, 94% of the Delaware Chapter 11 debtors
listed a non-Delaware address. 12 Only 5.3% of filings in other states

5.
Ocean Props., 95 B.R. at 305.
6.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 968
(1999).
7.
Id. at 973.
8.
Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations,94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (2000).
9.
See Mark D. Collins, Why Delaware?, DEL. LAW, Fall 1997, at 38.
10. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231,
234 (2001). LoPucki and Kalin define large, public debtors as those with assets exceeding $100
million in 1980 dollars and those required to file annual reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Id. at 235 n.15.
11. Id. at 235.
12. Edward Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Delaware Chapter 11's,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2002, at 20. The statistics cited by Flynn and Bermant were obtained
from the Fee Information and Collection System maintained by the Executive Office for United
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involved debtors listing addresses outside the state in which the
petition was filed. 13 An analysis of the fifteen largest cases filed each
year from 1995 through 2001, a total of 105 cases in all, shows that
fifty-six of these high-profile cases were filed in Delaware. 14 The
Southern District of New York was a distant second with eighteen. No
other state had more than three. 15 Table 1 illustrates both the recency
and consistency of this trend.16
Table 1
Chapter 11 Filings: Delaware vs. the Nation
Year

Chapter 11 Filings:
All Districts
Combined*

Delaware
Chapter 11
Filings

Delaware
Percentage of All
Chapter 11 Filings

2001

10,967

1,222

11.1

2000

9,716

2,277

23.4

1999

9,181

2,106

22.9

1998

8,283

385

4.4

1997

10,554

205

1.9

1996

11,726

211

1.8

1995

12,771

235

1.8

1994

14,823

83

0.6

1993

19,180

101

0.5

1992

22,906

176

0.8

1991

24,056

102

0.4

1990
20,690
104
0.5
*This figure excludes Chapter 11 petitions filed in Alabama and North Carolina.17

The emergence of Delaware as the preferred venue for
bankruptcy has been accompanied by a parallel development: the
increase in the use of "prepackaged" Chapter 11 cases. "Prepacks" are
States Trustees, and exclude information on Alabama and North Carolina cases, which are
served by bankruptcy administrators.
13. Id. at 21.
14. See BankruptcyData.com (listing the fifteen largest bankruptcy cases, by total assets,
for each year since 1995).
15. Id.
16. Id. The recent and dramatic decline in Delaware bankruptcy cases in 2001 is addressed
infra Part IV.C.2.
17. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 12, at 20. Flynn and Bermant assert that the raw
numbers somewhat overstate the rise of Delaware bankruptcy, because many more of the cases
filed in Delaware are groupings of one large debtor with its various subsidiaries and affiliated
companies. Id. Nevertheless, this understanding of the nature of the Delaware filings provides a
proxy for complexity that a simple "one debtor, one filing" approach might actually understate.
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cases in which the debtor's bankruptcy filing takes place in
conjunction with a plan of reorganization that has been negotiated
18
with and agreed to by the debtor's creditors prior to the filing.
Between 1986 and 1990, only eight, or 1.2%, of the 633 publicly held
corporations that filed for bankruptcy filed a "prepackaged" plan. 19
That number increased to seventy, or 11.3%, of the 622 public
companies that filed for bankruptcy between 1991 and 1997.20 Of that
number, roughly half of the "prepackaged" plans were filed in
Delaware. 21 This preference for Delaware in the filing of
"prepackaged" Chapter 11 cases is greater than the general preference
for Delaware in the filing of traditional Chapter 11 cases and
22
evidences an increasing creditor preference for Delaware venue.
Early in 1997, the onslaught of cases hitting the Delaware
court's docket caused alarm. By order dated January 31, 1997, Chief
Judge Joseph Farnan of the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware withdrew the order that automatically referred
bankruptcy cases to the Delaware bankruptcy judges. 23 In his order,
he stated that the number of bankruptcy cases had caused it to be
appropriate and necessary for district judges to participate in these
cases. 24 Under the Judiciary Act, federal district courts are given
exclusive and original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. 25 The
Supreme Court has determined that this jurisdiction is required by
Article III of the Constitution. 26 Title 28 also authorizes a district
court to automatically refer bankruptcy cases to bankruptcy judges
within its district. 27 Prior to 1997, the district court in Delaware, like
all other districts, automatically referred bankruptcy cases to the

18.

See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 835 (1997).

19. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1375.
20. Alan Denton, Large and Small Companies Exhibit Diverging Bankruptcy Trends (Jan.
2002), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyticalfbank/bt0201.html.
21. Nancy L. Lazar & James I. McClammy, Recent Developments in the Law of Prepackaged
Bankruptcy Plans,820 PLI/COMM 309, 312 (2001).
22. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarizationof CorporateReorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 287 (2001).
23. Robert J. Rosenberg & Gregg D. Josephson, Recent Developments in the Law on Venue
in Bankruptcy Cases, 827 PLI/COMM 21 (2001).
24. Order of Chief Judge Joseph Farnan, United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, Jan. 31, 1997.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
26. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1982)
(holding that bankruptcy judges, as judges created pursuant to Article I of the Constitution,
could not exercise powers reserved to the federal judiciary under Article III).
27. § 1412.
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bankruptcy judges of that district. 28 The Delaware district court's
withdrawal of the automatic reference meant that bankruptcy cases
would now be assigned by the Chief Judge of the District Court and
heard by both bankruptcy judges and district court judges.
Even with district court and bankruptcy judges hearing
bankruptcy cases, the move to Delaware placed a strain on that court's
resources. Approximately 40% of the Delaware bankruptcy docket is
comprised of large Chapter 11 cases and large Chapter 7 cases that
were converted from Chapter 11 cases. 29 In December 2000, the
Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
commissioned a study to examine the Delaware bankruptcy workload,
which concluded that the court needed eight or nine judges to handle
the filings. 30 The strain has been alleviated somewhat by help from
the outside. For several years, all consumer bankruptcy cases in
Delaware have been heard by Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald of
Pittsburgh, who sits in Wilmington two days per month. 31 The
Chapter 11 load has been shared, from time to time, by seven visiting
judges "sitting by designation." 32 As an additional aid to case
administration, the District of Delaware's Chief Judge Sue Robinson,
by an order dated December 15, 2000 that became effective on
February 3, 2001, reinstated the automatic reference to the
33
bankruptcy judges.
One of the seven visiting judges sitting by designation was
Bankruptcy Judge Randall Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of California. 34 In three separate
Chapter 11 cases automatically referred to him, Judge Newsome, sua
sponte, asked the parties in each case to brief him on why venue in
Delaware was appropriate. 35 On April 6, 2001, four days after the
W.R. Grace filing, which, incidentally, was one of the cases assigned to
Judge Newsome, Chief Judge Robinson withdrew the automatic

28. Delaware District Court Withdraws Reference of All Chapter 11 Cases to Bankruptcy
Court, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) (Jan. 30, 1997), at 123.
29. See www.BankruptcyData.com.
30. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Bankruptcy, Dec.
2000.
31. Judge Fitzgerald is also the President of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.
32. United States District Judges Judith H. Wizmer of Camden, New Jersey, and Raymond
T. Lyons of Trenton, New Jersey, have sat frequently in Wilmington to hear several of the larger
cases.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 155(a) (2000) (providing for the temporary transfer of bankruptcy
judges).
34. Judge Newsome ordinarily sits in Oakland, California.
35. See Rosenberg & Josephson, supra note 23, at 33.
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reference once again. 36 In her order, Judge Robinson stated that "the
judges of the District Court have determined that the workload of the
bankruptcy judges is threatening the administration of justice in the
bankruptcy court, and therefore, that it is once again appropriate and
necessary that judges of the District Court participate in the handling
of such cases." 37 Five months later, on September 6, 2001, Chief Judge
Robinson once again reinstated the automatic reference, which
became effective October 6, 2001.38 As an explanation for this action,
David Bird, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware, said
publicly that the two sitting bankruptcy judges in Delaware had not
had "new cases since April of 2001" and thus "had an opportunity to
39
clear their calendars."
The explosion of the bankruptcy docket in Delaware has raised
more than just the eyebrows of the chief judges of the district court.
Delaware venue was becoming a problem in the eyes of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission ("NBRC"). The NBRC was
established under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 to investigate
issues relating to the Bankruptcy Code and to evaluate proposals for
change in the future. 40 Delaware venue had been on the agenda of the
NBRC early on, in large part because of studies by the Federal
Judicial Center, as well as by Professors Lynn LoPucki and William
Whitford, that suggested that large Chapter 11 cases were
41
characterized by widespread forum-shopping.
The NBRC, consistent with this conclusion, crafted a report to
Congress that addressed these concerns. 42 In its report, the NBRC
recommended that the debtor's state of incorporation be expressly
eliminated as a basis for venue in a bankruptcy case. 43 Although the
commissioners stated that this proposed change "is not directed at the
bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of New York, those in
Delaware, or in any other specific bankruptcy venue," 44 commentators

36. Order of Susan Robinson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of
Delaware, Apr. 6, 2001.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Delaware District Court Reinstates Chapter 11 Reference, 37 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 3
(2001).
40.

See DAVID SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION 231 (2001).

41. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIs. L. REV. 11, 34-36
(1991).
42.

NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 770-87 (1997).

43.
44.

Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
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and news reports interpreted the change as an attack on Delaware's
45
emergence as the front-runner in the race for Chapter 11 cases.
The shift in the political winds that blew through Washington
with the Republican Revolution in 1994, however, doomed the NBRC's
position on most of its proposals, including its anti-Delaware
provision. 46 The proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 4 7 as
introduced, did not change the corporate bankruptcy venue
provision. 48 During the House Judiciary Committee's markup session
on the bill, however, Representative Howard L. Berman from
California inserted an anti-Delaware amendment in the bill on a voice
50
vote. 49 The House passed the bill containing this amendment.
However, both of Delaware's Senators protected the s~iatus quo in
Delaware, and the final bill as passed by the Senate did not contain an
anti-Delaware amendment5 1 The final bill was vetoed by President
Clinton in December 2000.52 More recently, the House and Senate
versions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2002 have no significant
changes to the venue provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and even
provide an additional bankruptcy judgeship to the District of
Delaware. 53 Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware has publicly stated
that as long as he is on the Senate Judiciary Committee, it is unlikely
that any so-called anti-Delaware amendment will be incorporated into
54
the Bankruptcy Code.
Other courts have taken notice of the developments in
Delaware too. The Southern District of New York, the dethroned
heavyweight champion of Chapter 11 venue, and Delaware's chief
rival in the race for bankruptcy petitions, promulgated formal
45. NY Bankruptcy Court's New Chapter: Reforms, Crowded Delaware System Touch off
Huge Gains in Filings, 17 CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS. 3 (2001), available at 2001 WL 7065038.
46. SKEEL, supra note 40, at 197-99.
47. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999).
48. Rosenberg & Josephson, supra note 23, at 34.
49. The amendment stated that a corporation's domicile would be defined as its principal
place of business, effectively eliminating the state of incorporation alternative. See Celia Cohen,
Anti-Delaware Clause Put in Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 1999, at 5.
50. Rosenberg & Josephson, supra note 23, at 33.
51. S. 220, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001).
52. See Clinton Lets Bipartisan Bankruptcy Reform Die, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec.
20, 2000, at 01D, available at 2000 WL 26102558; see also Greg Miller, Bill Making Bankruptcy
Filings Harder for Individuals Nears, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL
2470049.
53. In § 1409(b) of title 28 of the United States Code, the bill would require adversary
proceedings for a nonconsumer debt against a noninsider of less than $10,000 to be heard in the
district where the defendant resides. S. 220; H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999). The thirty-twomember House and Senate Conference Committee includes Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware.
See Pending Legislation, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 26574114.
54. See Cohen, supra note 49, at 1; see also SKEEL, supra note 40, at 232.
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guidelines governing "prepackaged" reorganization cases. 55 Prior to
these guidelines, "prepacks" were structured to comply with the rules
governing traditional Chapter 11 petitions. In January 2000, the
Southern District of Texas (which encompasses Houston) revamped its
bankruptcy procedures with respect to Chapter 11 cases designated as
"complex." 56 To be deemed "complex," a case must be "of sufficient
scope." 57 Once a case is deemed complex, a judge must hold emergency
hearings and hear "first-day" motions no later than two days after a
58
request for a hearing has been filed.
In response to this development in the Southern District of
Texas, bankruptcy Judge Mary Walrath of the District of Delaware
sent the case of Apple Orthodontix, Inc., a Houston-based provider of
orthodontic services that had filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in
Delaware, back to Houston. 59 Judge Walrath's order stated that she
was "aware of the new rules in the Houston Court seeking to solve the
problem articulated by the debtor about prompt scheduling of
hearings... . [Q]uite frankly, comparing it to my own calendar, I
think [Houston] may be able to give the debtor a little better
60
service."
Despite the occasional transfer of venue back to corporate
headquarter districts, if there is a battle for bankruptcy venue, "[t]he
war is over and Delaware has won." 61 In recognition of this victory,
many large national law firms have opened offices in Wilmington
within the past three years, often staffing them exclusively with
bankruptcy practitioners. 62
Delaware's recent rise as a bankruptcy haven cannot be
explained as a simple function of its preeminence in the corporate
charter race. Bankruptcy law is federal, not state, law. A bankruptcy
55.

Southern District of New York, Guidelines for Prepackaged Chapter 11 Petitions.

56.

Houston, We Know We Have a Problem (but We're Working on It!), 35 BANKR. CT.

DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Feb. 8, 2000, at Al; see also David E. Rovella, Texas, Del.
Lock Horns: Lone Star State Won't Leave Bankruptcy PracticeAlone, DEL. L. WKLY., Aug. 14,
2001, at 1.
57. Rovella, supra note 56.
58. Id. In bankruptcy, "first-day" orders are the judicial orders that constitute exceptions to
the blanket automatic stay, permitting the payment of payroll, completion of debtor-inpossession financing transactions, and addressing any immediate actions that are necessary to
operate the business day to day. See DEL. BANKR. L.R. 2014-1.
59. In re Apple Orthodontix Inc., unpublished order.
60. Id.
61. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 22, at 283.
62. Reed Smith Shaw, Shearman and Sterling, and Jones Day Reavis and Pogue are among
the several firms opening Wilmington offices between 2000 and 2002. See Nielson Elggren Opens
Delaware Office, 38 BANKR. CT. DEC. (LRP) 1 (Dec. 25, 2001); Jeff Blumenthal, Buchanan
Ingersoll Will Open Delaware Office, DEL. L. WKLY., Mar. 13, 2001, at 1.
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judge is appointed by the United States court of appeals for the circuit
in which the judge sits, not by the President of the United States, as is
the case for Article III judges.6 3 Unlike Article III judges, bankruptcy
judges are selected without the advice and consent of the U.S.
Senators for their respective states. Bankruptcy judges are not chosen
from among the highly respected and sophisticated chancellors on the
Delaware state court bench. They need not even be members of the
influential Delaware bar. In fact, the most recent appointee, Judge
Mary F. Walrath, was a Philadelphia bankruptcy attorney when she
was tapped by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit to replace retiring Judge Helen S. Balick. The court of appeals
appointment power highlights another distinction between the
bankruptcy bench and the Delaware state courts: bankruptcy judges
are not directly accountable to the state bar. Furthermore, while they
do not have the life tenure enjoyed by Article III judges, they do
64
receive the shelter afforded by fourteen-year terms.
Delaware's ascent as the preferred locale for bankruptcy venue
has stimulated heated debate among academics. The "Delaware
Skeptics," to use Professor David Skeel's nomenclature, include
Professor Lynn LoPucki of UCLA School of Law, and his coauthor,
Professor Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell Law School. 65 The Skeptics
believe that the choice of Delaware is evidence of a pernicious race to
the bottom.6 6 LoPucki and Eisenberg, for instance, argue that the
choice of Delaware is a product of judicial laxity on the part of the
Delaware bankruptcy judges with respect to the details of plans of
reorganization, as well as their refusal to scrutinize attorneys' fee
applications. 67 Professor LoPucki and his coauthor, Sara Kalin,
attribute the increased number of failed plans emanating from
Delaware proceedings as supporting evidence for this claim. 68 The
Skeptics advocate the inclusion of an anti-Delaware provision in the
bankruptcy reform bill, largely through the efforts of Professor
Elizabeth Warren, the official reporter to the National Bankruptcy
Reform Commission. 69 This effort appears doomed, however, as

63. 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000).
64. See § 152(a).
65. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 6, at 969.
66. Id. at 1002.
67. Id.
68. LoPucki & Kaln, supra note 10, at 233.
69. NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY, supra note 42; see also Eisenberg & LoPucki,
supra note 6, at 973.
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Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware has vowed to kill any bankruptcy
bill with such a provision.70
Other academics view Delaware bankruptcy venue quite
differently. The "Delaware Enthusiasts," among whom Skeel numbers
himself, Professors Robert Rasmussen and Randall Thomas of
Vanderbilt University Law School, and Douglas Baird of the
University of Chicago Law School, attribute Delaware's prominence to
the efficiency and sophistication of the two Delaware bankruptcy
judges and the pressures they experience within the Delaware legal
culture. 71 Skeel champions the move to Delaware as a product of
market forces that seek efficient restructuring of financially distressed
corporations and points to the dramatic rise in "prepackaged"
bankruptcies as evidence of this positive development. 72 Rasmussen,
Thomas, and Baird view Delaware's emergence as the first step
toward the "contractualization" and privatization of corporate
reorganizations, and perhaps back toward the equity receiverships
that distinguished American corporate reorganization one hundred
73
years ago.
Despite the controversy concerning perceived forum-shopping
by corporations, little research has been done to understand what
motivates the venue-selection decision by lawyers, and what might
lead judges to attract cases to their own district. In order to ascertain
whether the alarm expressed by the Delaware Skeptics is justified and
whether Congress ought to take seriously the efforts aimed at curbing
Delaware venue, some understanding of the underlying motives is
necessary. The next two parts of this Article explore the motivations
on both sides of the venue-selection equation through the lens of
opinions and explanations offered by lawyers and judges. Part II
examines the factors that lead lawyers to choose Delaware for the
filing of a Chapter 11 petition, while Part III explores why judges
might want to attract Chapter 11 cases. These explanations are then
followed in Parts IV and V by an examination of how they fit within
current understandings of jurisdictional competition.

70. SKEEL, supra note 40, at 231.
71. David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 20, 26 (1998).
72. See David A. Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 328
(2001).
73. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 956-58 (2001);
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 22, at 287.
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II. LAWYERS' EXPLANATIONS FOR CHOOSING DELAWARE

The venue-selection decision for any large, publicly held
company ultimately depends on the judgment of the debtor's counsel.
It is true that these companies face the possibility of being forced into
bankruptcy and a concomitant bankruptcy venue through the filing of
an involuntary petition by its creditors, but creditor incentives and
Bankruptcy Code discouragements make such an occurrence
unlikely. 74 In reality, virtually all proceedings involving a publicly
held debtor commence voluntarily, and a disproportionate number of
voluntary petitions are now filed in the District of Delaware. 75
Creditors' counsel are very influential in the venue-selection process,
particularly when consensual "prepackaged" Chapter 11 petitions are
filed. But even when creditors' counsel make their preferences known,
the venue of choice is Delaware. 76 In order to gain an understanding of
why Delaware has become the venue of choice for both managers and
creditors of publicly held companies, it is necessary to understand why
lawyers see Delaware as a superior selection given the alternatives.
A. The Factorsfor Lawyers
1. Predictability
The prominent debtors' and creditors' counsel with whom I
have spoken list several factors as important in their choice of
Delaware as a forum. Leading their list is "predictability." While
virtually every lawyer and most of the judges interviewed used this
word, all of them referred to at least one of two different types of
predictability. First, most lawyers intervieved said that the choice of
Delaware is substantially driven by the fact that the debtor knows it
will have its case heard by a "good" judge. Since Delaware is a small
district with only two bankruptcy judges, attorneys filing petitions
know that they have a 50% chance of getting one of the two. Most
lawyers also suggested that if they had to file a petition tomorrow,
they would be satisfied with either Judge Walsh or Judge Walrath,
Delaware's two bankruptcy judges.7 7 The debtors' and creditors'
74. Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the requirements for the filing of an
involuntary petition, and includes sanctions and penalties for improper and bad-faith filings,
including compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys fees, and court costs. 11 U.S.C. §
303(h), (i) (2000).
75. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 10, at 234.
76. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1374.
77. Two lawyers, out of over thirty, expressed reservations about the possibility of having
the case heard by Judge Walrath.
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counsel interviewed all asserted that, while this factor was of primary
importance to them in the choice-of-venue calculus, it has decreased in
importance with the case backlog that has led to the assignment of
cases to visiting and district court judges.
Lawyers also meant something else, in addition to judges,
when they used the term "predictability" to explain their choice of
Delaware. Many of the debtors' counsel pointed to the existence of
precedent in complex cases as lending predictability to new filings
there. 78 According to one New York bankruptcy attorney, "When I file
a retailer case in Delaware, I know that the judge will understand the
special issues surrounding inventory, for example, and I also have an
idea how those issues will be resolved." One lawyer who has recently
moved to Delaware reports that "process and predictability are 90% of
[the decision of where to file], and we have judges who understand
that."
2. Speed
Nearly all of the lawyers interviewed mentioned speed as an
important benefit they associated with Delaware bankruptcy venue.
The ability of Delaware bankruptcy judges to quickly dispose of cases,
and issues within a case, was said to be an important expectation of
debtors. The direct costs of a Chapter 11 proceeding are widely
acknowledged to be substantial, although no empirical study of such
costs has established them with any certainty.7 9 Speed was often
mentioned as an aspect of predictability, and lawyers credited
streamlined procedures for first-day orders, the judges' familiarity
with cases involving a particular industry or credit relationship, and
the resolutions obtained 'in similar cases. Both debtors' counsel and
creditors' counsel alike trumpeted speed as a predictable by-product of
judicial experience. One attorney posited that a case filed in Delaware
78. Nearly all of the lawyers who were asked to clarify what they meant by "precedent"
explained that they were referring to unpublished but widely understood results of prior
procedural rulings. One element of particular importance was an open letter written by Judge
Walsh to the Delaware bar that explained what types of financing provisions would be acceptable
in first-day and other filings and what types of arrangements were unacceptable. All lawyers
with whom I spoke were very aware of the contents of the letter, a copy of which is reproduced in
Appendix.
79. For evidence about reorganization costs, see Brian L. Betker, The Administrative Costs
of Debt Restructurings: Some Recent Evidence, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1997, at 56. The only
empirical study of direct costs associated with the duration of a bankruptcy proceeding was
conducted by Lawless and Ferris, but that study involved only Chapter 7 cases. See Robert M.
Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business
Liquidations, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1207, 1230-31 (1997) (reporting that time in bankruptcy is a
significant determinant of administrative costs).
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results in a cost savings to the estate. "If it doesn't take as long to get
the judge up to speed, Delaware may be cheaper" than cases filed in
other districts.
Empirical studies of case-processing time have produced mixed
results. One study commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the
United States suggested that cases filed in Delaware were concluded
much more quickly than those filed in other districts.8 0 This study
examined Chapter 11 cases filed in 1994 and 1995, and demonstrated
81
significant time savings for cases filed in Delaware.
Eisenberg and LoPucki take issue with the findings of the
Judicial Conference report. They studied- the speed with which
bankruptcy courts dispose of their docket and concluded that
Delaware judges do not process cases more quickly than those in other
districts.82 While Eisenberg and LoPucki acknowledge the time
savings associated with Chapter 11s filed in Delaware as a whole, that
district's advantage drops sharply when "prepackaged" cases are
removed from the pool.8 3 When traditional Chapter 11 cases are
considered, the Delaware judges boast mean and median caseprocessing times of 510 and 463 days, respectively.8 4 To be sure, these
numbers are significantly faster than the Southern District of New
York's mean and median of 765 and 582 days, but Eisenberg and
LoPucki show that Delaware processing time shows no statistically
85
significant difference from that of other districts around the nation.
Despite the evidence produced by Eisenberg and LoPucki, the
perception that the Delaware judges process cases more quickly than
those in other districts is real and widespread among the lawyers
interviewed.
3. (The Absence of) "Real Law"
The third most important factor in the venue-selection
analysis, according to the lawyers interviewed, was the state of
substantive law with regard to the central issues of their cases. The
role of this factor, however, was quite different than, and seemingly
contradictory to, the predictability of Delaware venue. Counsel for
80. See Gordon Bermant et al., Chapter 11 Venue Choice by Large Public Companies:Report
to the JudicialConference Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, FED. JUD.
CTR. 1997, at 37 (discussing filings in 1994 and 1995), available at http://www.fjc.gov/publid
pdf.nsf/lookup/chllvenue.pdf/$file/chllvenue.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2001).
81. Id.
82. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 6, at 1001-02.
83. Id, at 988-89.
84. Id. at 989.
85. Id.
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debtors stressed the absence of what they termed "real law" as a
reason to choose a particular district over others. The absence of
established substantive precedent, according to debtors' counsel,
actually enhanced the bargaining position of debtors. In other words,
the absence of this type of predictability was actually a virtue in the
eyes of debtors, affording room for creative and novel solutions to a
company's financial predicament.
Given the emphasis on procedural predictability, a preference
for an absence of substantive certainty might seem odd. Nevertheless,
several of the attorneys for both debtors and creditors offered
examples of how the absence of "real law" enhanced a district's
standing for purposes of venue. The most commonly cited example
concerned the assumption of intellectual property licenses. The Ninth
Circuit sent shock waves through both bankruptcy and intellectual
property circles with its decision in Perlman v. Catapult
Entertainment, Inc.8 6 Catapult was a California corporation that filed
for bankruptcy in 1996 in order to effect a "reverse triangular
merger."87 The company was not insolvent; it merely wished to use the
Chapter 11 reorganization mechanisms to reduce the costs of its
merger. During the bankruptcy proceeding, Catapult filed a motion, as
debtor-in-possession wielding the full powers of the trustee, to assume
some 140 executory contracts, including its intellectual property
licenses.88 When one licensor's objections fell on deaf ears in the
bankruptcy and district courts, he appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
which reversed the lower court rulings permitting the assumption of
the licenses.8 9 The court held that the plain language of the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits assumption of executory contracts by a
debtor-in-possession where those contracts are unassignable under
90
applicable nonbankruptcy law.

86. 165 F.3d 747, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1999).
87. A reverse triangular merger is one in which the acquiring company sets up a subsidiary
to merge with the target company, which then automatically becomes a subsidiary of the
acquirer. Id. at 749.
88. Id. at 753.
89. Id. at 757.
90. Id. at 753. The Ninth Circuit's holding was based on the fact that 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)
places a limitation on the assumption of executory contracts. In relevant part, § 365(c) provides
that:
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of
rights or delegation of duties, if (1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or
not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties; and (B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment ....
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Debtors whose going-concern value is closely associated with
intellectual property licenses are well advised to steer clear of
bankruptcy venue in the Ninth Circuit, as well as circuits that follow
the Catapult rule. The Third Circuit, which contains the District of
Delaware, is just such a circuit, and according to many lawyers has
lost bankruptcy cases for precisely that reason. 91 The First Circuit has
a rule exactly opposite to that established by the Ninth Circuit in
Catapult and has become a more attractive venue for reorganizations
92
involving intellectual property licensees.
Other examples of venue decisions heavily influenced by real
law include the rule with respect to priority of real estate tax
assessments. In the Third Circuit, for example, a real estate tax bill
payable on a date after the filing of the petition receives an
administrative expense priority for the full amount due, even though
the lion's share of the tax accrued prior to the petition date.9 3 The
prevailing rule in the Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, prorates real
estate taxes, making any portion accruing up to the date of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition a prepetition claim, with only that portion
which actually represents postpetition holdings worthy of
administrative expense priority. 94 Several lawyers speculated that the
Kmart bankruptcy filing in the Northern District of Illinois was
calculated to take advantage of this particular rule and the tens of
millions of dollars in tax savings it represented to the estate.
4. Sophistication of the Judges
The emphasis on predictability in lawyer responses frequently
accompanied another factor, namely the sophistication of Delaware's
91. The Catapult rule has been adopted by the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits. See In
re James Cable Partners, 27 F.3d 534, 537 (11th Cir. 1994); In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79,
83 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Catron, 158 B.R. 629, 633-638 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd per curiam, 25 F.3d
1038 (4th Cir. 1994).
92. The First Circuit rule, designated the "actual performance test," was established in
Institut Pasteur & Pasteur Sanofi Diagnostics v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 492
(1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997). The actual performance test can be
characterized as the opposite of the "hypothetical test" applied in Catapult, in that it requires a
demonstration that the executory license at issue was actually in danger of being captured by an
undesireable competitor of the licensor. Id.
93. In re C.S. Assocs., 29 F.3d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Section 503... indicates that tax
claims are generally afforded the status of ordinary administrative expenses, thereby receiving
first priority after secured claims, unless they are the type of taxes specified in § 507(a)(7), in
which case they will receive a seventh ranked priority after secured claims.").
94. Nat'l Terminals Corp. v. Handy Andy Home Improvement Ctrs., Inc., 222 B.R. 149, 152
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (Williams, J.) (holding that debtor was "not obligated to pay the second
installment 1994 real estate tax bills or the first installment 1995 real estate tax bills because
those taxes accrued prior to the petition date").
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judges. All of the attorneys who regularly represent debtors made
reference to the competence and sophistication of the Delaware
bankruptcy bench. As one Chicago bankruptcy lawyer put it, "If I'm a
smart lawyer, with a big, complex case, I want judges who will be able
to follow and understand my arguments." Another Chicago attorney
who regularly represents financial institutions added that "time is
money; if it takes time to educate the judge on a particular point, then
the proceeding will cost more in the long run."
There is a "path-dependent" component to the sophistication
factor articulated by so many bankruptcy lawyers. The Delaware
bankruptcy court is viewed as a preferred venue for complex cases in
part because these judges have handled many complex cases in the
past. The "human capital" that they have developed lends to the
efficient, effective, and speedy resolution of subsequent cases. As a
result, few lawyers expressed comfort about the prospect of filing
complex cases in other, less experienced districts.
The sophistication of the Delaware bankruptcy bench has won
it substantial notoriety in bankruptcy circles. As one Texas
bankruptcy attorney noted, "[E]verybody knows the names of the two
judges in Delaware; can you name any two bankruptcy judges in
Atlanta, Boston, or Dallas?" This national reputation is remarkably
detailed. Many of the lawyers, for example, noted that Judge Walsh
has an admirable work ethic and "puts in very long hours." Others
asserted that Judge Walrath was a fitting replacement for Judge
Helen Balick, who retired from the Delaware bankruptcy bench in
1995. 95 According to one California lawyer, "[S]he is as smart as any
bankruptcy judge in the country." Another California lawyer thought
that, while he held much admiration and respect for Judge Walrath,
no judge could fill the shoes of Judge Balick. "She was a tough act to
follow; Walrath is very smart, don't get me wrong, but she's no Helen
Balick."
5. Responsiveness and Availability of the Judges
A commonly cited factor by lawyers was that of responsiveness.
Debtors' counsel universally refer to the ability to get first-day orders
on the first or second day after filing as a critical consideration in the
venue-selection process. In bankruptcy, first-day orders are the
judicial orders that constitute exceptions to the blanket automatic
stay, permitting the payment of payroll, completion of debtor-in-

95. Jef Feeley, Key Bankruptcy Post to Be Filled:Phila. Lawyer Named to Long Vacant Del.
Court Spot, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at B5.
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possession financing transactions, and any other immediate action
that is necessary to operate the business day to day. 96 The Delaware
bankruptcy bench has a well-established reputation, according to the
lawyers interviewed, for getting first-day orders heard and issued
quickly. Judge Walrath in particular was widely praised for her ability
to decide first-day orders before the end of business on the day after
the petition is filed. 97
Many lawyers with whom I spoke noted that the
responsiveness of the Delaware bankruptcy judges was not
independent of their sophistication and experience with complex
cases. According to one New York bankruptcy attorney, "If I have to
educate the judge on the overwhelming importance of getting a
particular order quickly, and if she has to read briefs from all sides on
the issue, then I've lost before I've started." A Delaware-based
bankruptcy attorney put it another way: "If the judge has seen fifteen
cases like yours, then she knows what first-day orders you need before
you walk in the door."
Judicial responsiveness, in the eyes of lawyers, goes beyond
first-day orders. Many of the attorneys cited the "availability" of the
Delaware bankruptcy bench as exceptional. The Delaware judges were
praised for their willingness to "bend over backwards" to accommodate
parties when scheduling hearings or meetings. A San Francisco
bankruptcy attorney said that the judges are sensitive to attorney
travel demands and have gone so far as to schedule hearings in
unrelated cases with an eye toward his convenience: "It's not always
possible, but it's nice when I can get both covered in one trip." Others
noted that the judges have been willing to stay late to address the
needs of cases and frequently work through weekends. According to
one judge who has visited the Delaware bankruptcy court, "[T]hose
two judges work very hard, and they are willing to do what the case
requires." The willingness of the judges to hold emergency hearings
was also listed as evidence of their availability.
6. Attorneys' Fee Applications
The uniform responses of lawyers were more mixed when the
sensitive subject of attorneys' fees was broached. Attorneys' fees in a
bankruptcy proceeding are awarded by the court pursuant to § 330 of

96. See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its
Parameters,73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 37-39 (1989).
97. See DEL. BANKR. L.R. 4001-2(b) (containing substantial restrictions on the content of
first-day orders).
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the Bankruptcy Code. 98 Court approval of the debtor's attorneys' fees
is required in bankruptcy because all professional fees are considered
administrative expenses of the proceedings.9 9 As administrative
expenses, they come out of the common pool that is supposed to
benefit the general creditors. 10 0 Court approval ensures, theoretically,
that the pie in which the creditors share is actually enhanced by the
services provided by the professionals.
Although § 330 grants courts hearing bankruptcy cases the
power to award attorneys' fees, it does not dictate the method by
which fee applications are evaluated and approved. Many districts
around the country have developed local rules to accomplish this task.
Much is left to the discretion of the judge. The Delaware Skeptics have
asserted that the Delaware judges have effectively "rubber-stamped"
attorneys' fee applications, handing over whatever debtors' counsel
desire.101
While all of the lawyers queried adamantly reject the assertion
that the Delaware judges fail to scrutinize fee applications, they are
divided about the role that attorneys' fees play in the venue-selection
decision process. Some bankruptcy lawyers rejected the idea that fee
applications played a role in the venue calculus at all. "If I have a
large client, with millions of dollars on the line, do you think I'd risk a
less than optimal outcome for a few bucks in the short run?" Another
attorney thought the fee issue was a smokescreen. According to him,
the speed and efficiency of a Delaware filing might mean fewer hours
and less work than a filing elsewhere. "Delaware cases may actually
be cheaper."
A slight majority of attorneys thought that fees played some
role, but not in the manner suggested by those asserting that the
Delaware judges "turn their heads." These lawyers insisted that
Delaware judges do not rubber-stamp fee applications submitted by
debtors' counsel. They believe that although Delaware judges' level of
scrutiny may be less than that of other judges in the Third Circuit
(who typically order the submission of voluminous and costly fee
application reports produced by independent auditors), it is inaccurate
to assert that Delaware judges will approve any fee item.
Lawyers who acknowledged that fee applications influence the
filing decision claimed that it did so indirectly, because some districts
arbitrarily cap fees at the rates prevailing in the local jurisdiction.

98.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2000).

99. See DEL. BANKR. L.R. 2014-1.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (2000).
101. See LoPucki & Kahn, supra note 10, at 238.
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"Utah bankruptcy judges, for example, will not allow debtors' counsel
to be paid anything more than the prevailing rate in Provo, even if a
particular corporate debtor's counsel is based in New York or Los
Angeles." According to one debtors' counsel, "a court's policy on fees is
likely to drive cases away, rather than attract." Therefore, if cases are
driven away from the principal place of business, one "other
alternative is the place of incorporation, Delaware." In response to the
flight of cases to Delaware, the Chief Judge of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas made the
remarkable public announcement that "the war on attorneys' fee
10 2
applications is over."'
Delaware has another policy on fees that only one lawyer
thought influenced venue selection. The District of Delaware was the
first to issue a local rule that permitted as much as 80% of attorneys'
fees to be paid on a continuing, monthly basis. 10 3 In many other
districts, lawyers must wait until the end of the case to be paid or
petition the court for interim compensation in long cases.10 4 Even the
lawyer who thought this rule was important suggested its influence
was not purely self-serving. "It allows clients the ability to track and
budget their legal expenses as the proceeding goes along." He also
thought that the absence of this rule was more likely to repel cases
from the headquarters district rather than draw cases to Delaware.
7. Geographic Convenience
Much has been made about the geographic convenience of
Delaware, and lawyers generally agree that this factor plays a modest
role in the venue-selection decision. Wilmington enjoys proximity to
Philadelphia with its international airport and Amtrak train station.
Many lawyers said that not too much should be made of Delaware's
geographic convenience. It is, after all, less convenient to New York
companies than the Manhattan bankruptcy court. One lawyer quipped
that the bankruptcy court in Wilmington is "just a two-hour train ride
from most company headquarters in New York; then again, the same
is true for the bankruptcy court in Manhattan."
Geographic convenience cannot be universally true for all
debtors, and the evidence gathered by Eisenberg and LoPucki seems
to bear this out.10 5 With the exceptions of companies based in Santa
Ana (California) and New York, the percentage of companies choosing
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Rovella, supra note 56.
See DEL. BANKR. L.R. 9010-1.
Interim compensation can be requested every 120 days. See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 6, at 979.
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Delaware venue is much higher for those based in eastern cities than
for those based in western ones. 10 6 Midwestern cities like Chicago and
Dallas experience a lower "shop out" rate than those in the East but a
higher rate than Los Angeles or Denver. 10 7 Still, one San Francisco
bankruptcy attorney remains undaunted by the prospect of Delaware
venue. "Distance isn't really an issue; there's good air service, I know
the flight schedules, and I get a lot of work done on the plane."
8. Creditor Pressure
Creditor pressure, one of the factors the Delaware Skeptics
believe is driving the convoy to Delaware, received a mixed reception
from both debtors' and creditors' counsel. While a few debtors' counsel
acknowledged that a powerful creditor's preference for Delaware
venue might influence or even tip the balance in that direction, other
lawyers representing debtors claimed that creditor pressure for venue
was either nonexistent or not important. The ways in which creditor
pressure might operate can vary. Some creditors might, for example,
withhold workout approval or debtor-in-possession (postpetition)
financing unless the petition is filed in Delaware. Some of the debtors'
counsel acknowledged that lenders may insist upon "Delaware filing"
covenants in their postpetition lending agreements, while others say
they have never allowed a creditor to dictate the place of filing. One
lawyer adamantly declared that "[he] would never let a creditor tell
[him] where to file." He added, "If I say 'no,' what are they going to
do?"
Despite this display of machismo, there is undisputable
evidence of some creditor preference for Delaware. It takes the form of
covenants incorporated in postpetition lending agreements that are
prepared in anticipation of a "prepackaged" Chapter 11 or in workout
documents that contemplate a Chapter 11 filing. Whether such
covenants are enforceable is an interesting question but not one
within the scope of this Article. The relevance of these covenants, for
our purposes, is the sentiments of which they provide evidence: a
creditor preference for Delaware. Professors Rasmussen and Thomas
argue that such a preference is understandable and even laudable,
given a creditor's interest in a speedy, efficient, and resourceconserving reorganization process. 108 Most lawyers thought that
creditor preference was a real, but not particularly powerful, factor.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 998-99.
108. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1359-66.
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One thing about which the Delaware Skeptics are correct is the
influence of secured creditors on the place of filing. As one prominent
attorney put it, "These days, secured creditors call all of the shots."
Secured creditors, through the power afforded them by their collateral,
can influence many of the debtor's key decisions, including venue
selection. Theoretically, secured creditors should not be concerned
with bankruptcy because, as the old adage goes, "Liens pass through
bankruptcy." 10 9 The reality is that secured creditors do care because of
the possibility of depreciation of the secured asset during a long
proceeding. To protect secured creditors from depreciation, the
Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to give the secured creditor
"adequate protection."1 10 Fights between a secured creditor and the
debtor have historically involved the adequacy of the protection. The
fight between the secured lender and creditor has dissipated in the
large Delaware filings, however: the debtor can now assure the
secured creditor adequate protection by agreeing to pay, up front, for
the secured creditor's professionals. 1 ' It is unclear whether such
consensual arrangements constitute the "indubitable equivalent" of
adequate protection for the secured lender, as described by § 361 of
1 12
the Bankruptcy Code.
9. Danger of a Bad Local (Home) Judge
Many lawyers added the risk of drawing a "bad" hometown
judge as a very important factor leading to the Delaware venue
decision. In a manner similar to the effect attributed to attorneys' fee
receptivity, the existence of an undesirable judge in the district of the
company's principal place of business had the tendency to drive cases
away. Since Delaware is an alternative for so many public companies,
Delaware gets the nod. When asked what they meant by a "bad" local
judge, lawyers responded with a wide array of characterizations which
included "crazy," "dumb," "not very bright," "lazy," "inconsistent,"
"biased," and "slow." One bankruptcy judge added that he thought
many lawyers are terrified of getting judges who have standing
policies that make no sense, such as an unwillingness to hold "a cash
collateral hearing until more than fifteen days after the case has been
109. This maxim has a long and distinguished history. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617,
620-21 (1886); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992); see also Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (describing how bankruptcy extinguishes in personam claims
against the debtor but generally has no effect on in rem claims against the debtor's property).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000).
111. This mechanism appears to be a new use of the third alternative, permitting adequate
protection to be afforded by "other appropriate means."
112. § 361(3).
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filed." Many lawyers felt that consistently bad judges were as
undesirable as inconsistent ones.
10. Intrusiveness of the Local (Home) United States Trustee
One final factor that came up in the responses of several
lawyers was the level and quality of the involvement of the United
States Trustee in the region in which a company has its principal
place of business.11 The United States Trustee, an office created by
the 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, is a federal government
official who performs various administrative tasks in a bankruptcy
proceeding. 11 4 In Chapter 7 cases, the trustee appoints an interim
trustee, and in Chapter 11 cases, the trustee monitors, evaluates, and
files comments on attorneys' fee applications.1 1 5 Perhaps more
importantly, § 1102 directs the United States Trustee to appoint the
members of the committee of unsecured creditors, and "additional
committees of creditors ... as the United States Trustee deems
appropriate."1 1 6 While these powers might appear relatively
innocuous, many lawyers expressed their belief that some United
States Trustees are "activists," exceeding the scope of their
administrative powers in order to affect the outcome of cases or the
negotiations that take place within them.
Several attorneys pointed to the actions of the United States
Trustee in the Pacific Gas and Electric ("PG&E") bankruptcy as an
example of an overzealous and intrusive exercise of authority. In that
case, the United States Trustee for the Northern and Eastern
Districts of California and the District of Nevada, Linda Ekstrom
Stanley, appointed a "Committee of Ratepayers." 7 She publicly
stated that her decision was intended to "give the consumers of
California a say in this proceeding."11 8 While many observers
applauded the decision, others viewed it as an unauthorized extension
of the United States Trustee's powers under the Code. 11 9 In the end,
Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali upheld PG&E's motion to disallow
113. The United States is divided into twenty-one regions for purposes of the United States
Trustee program. Each United States Trustee is appointed to a five-year term by the Attorney
General of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2000).
114. Originally tested in seventeen states and the District of Columbia, Congress expanded
the United States Trustee program in 1986 to make it nationwide.
115. § 586(a)(3).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
117. Claire Cooper, California Official Defends Panel in Pacific Gas, Electric Case in San
Francisco,SACRAMENTO BEE, May 16, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 20967166.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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the ratepayers' committee and its participation in the bankruptcy
proceeding. 120 Judge Montali asserted that ratepayers have other
means to protect their interests. 121 "The Bankruptcy Code, and the
Bankruptcy Court, were designed to resolve debtor-creditor problems,"
he wrote. "State agencies are where issues such as rates for electricity
are handled."'12 2 Stanley said she was "disappointed in the judge's
ruling.., because we were within our discretion to appoint a
23
ratepayers committee."'
Lawyers citing the PG&E bankruptcy said that the "activism"
of United States Trustees like Stanley introduces an element of
unpredictability and instability to a Chapter 11 proceeding. According
to one San Francisco attorney, "If there's any risk of something like
[the Stanley decision in PG&E] happening in my case, I'm going to
want to file it somewhere else." That somewhere else, he added, is
likely to be Delaware. According to one prominent attorney, a United
States Trustee's office only affects the decision on where to file in
those districts known for having a particularly intrusive United States
Trustee. In those districts, the United States Trustee "does what fee
restrictions do ... drives cases away." Delaware is not known for
having a particularly intrusive United States Trustee, although one
judge who has sat on the Delaware bankruptcy court as a visitor said
that he was "disappointed" with the United States Trustee's office
there. He said that the office was "not particularly helpful" when it
came to evaluating attorneys' fee applications. He added that perhaps
he "was just spoiled" by the helpfulness of his home court's United
States Trustee's office.
B. "Non-Factors"or Neutral ConsiderationsAccording to
Debtors' Counsel
When presented with the concerns of the Delaware Skeptics
about the motivations that might be driving the venue-selection
decision, many lawyers rejected some of the factors central to the
Skeptics' position. Among the factors that most lawyers thought were
irrelevant were the level of scrutiny with which judges reviewed and
confirmed plans of reorganization, the desires of managers to keep

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Tim Reiterman, The Energy Crisis: PG&E Judge Bars Panel of Customers Ruling:
Pacific Gas & Electric Co.'s 4 Million Customers Are Not Entitled to a Committee to Represent
Interests in Bankruptcy Case, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at B7, available at 2001 WL 2488063.
123. Id.
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their jobs, and the costs of retaining local counsel in a Delaware
proceeding.
1. Level of Plan Scrutiny
Most lawyers denied the assertion that the desire for a venue
where plans of reorganization will escape scrutiny drives the move to
Delaware. According to one Chicago-based creditors' counsel, "if
there's something wrong with a plan, the people most affected by it
will catch it." Another Chicago attorney added that it would be risky
to one's reputation as well as the client's case to try to slip something
past the Delaware court. "It wouldn't be worth it in the long run."
Lawyers also adamantly denied the premise that the Delaware
bankruptcy judges are more lax with regard to Chapter 11 plans than
judges in other districts. A lawyer based in San Diego replied that "the
judges in Delaware work faster because they are more experienced
and have seen lots of complex cases before, not because they are less
careful." All of the debtors' counsel with whom I spoke disputed
Professor LoPucki's insinuation that the judges in the District of
Delaware will rubber-stamp any pro-management plan. All contended
that the scrutiny that plans of reorganization receive in Delaware is
on par with what they meet in other districts around the country. "The
difference is that in Delaware," according to one Chicago attorney,
"the judges can look at and understand a plan more quickly,
particularly if they've seen a lot of these types of plan provisions
before."
2. Managers' Desires to Keep Their Jobs
Many lawyers instantly dismissed the notion that the desire of
debtor management to keep their jobs was a troublesome determinant
of the Delaware venue-selection decision. 124 One New York-based
debtors' counsel said, "The way they keep their jobs is to keep the
company going, and they do that by doing whatever it takes to have a
successful reorganization." He went on to say that if that meant
choosing to file in Delaware, it is because Delaware offered the
brightest prospects for success. Another New York attorney said much
the same. "Whether or not the managers get to keep their jobs is more
a function of how well the company comes through the reorganization
process." Managers, therefore, "are going to choose the forum that is
best for the company, because that's what is best for them, and that's
exactly how we ought to want them to think." Thus, in the view of
124. This argument was advanced by LoPucki and Kalin, see supra note 10, at 233.
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debtors' counsel, managers' desire to keep their jobs is likely to be
value-enhancing for a plan of reorganization.
3. Cost of Local Counsel
Delaware Local Bankruptcy Rule 9010-1 requires local coun'sel
for most parties. 125 Many commentators on Delawarization have
acknowledged the likelihood that local counsel in Delaware carry a
premium over counsel in other districts. 126 Yet this factor did not
appear to be a consideration in the minds of the lawyers charged with
the venue decision. Most of the debtors' counsel with whom I spoke
said that this cost was not a consideration at all. 'You pay them and
then move on." As noted earlier, many large national law firms have
opened Wilmington offices in part to satisfy the local counsel
requirement. 127

C. An Example: The Enron Bankruptcy Venue Decision
The above description of the factors that play a role in the
venue-selection process demonstrates that the decision is a complex
one, without a single determinant that can explain all Delaware cases.
A glimpse into the complexity and rationality of the venue-selection
decision can be found in the process that led to the filing of a case that
did not wind up in Delaware: Enron. The Enron decision team chose to
file in New York rather than Delaware. 12 A spokesperson for the
decision team explained the decision as follows. First, they rejected
Houston, Enron's "principal place of business," because the old policy
of the Southern District of Texas on fees had caused them to drive
away complex cases for years. 129 This meant that the Houston judges
lacked expertise in complex cases. They also did not want to undergo a
bankruptcy proceeding in a town where all of the (now disgruntled)
employees lived, and where the outcome of the case would be affected
by the evening news and local politics. 130

125. DEL. BANKE. L.R. 9010-1 (2002).
126. Id.
127. See supra note 62.
128. Richard B. Schmitt & Michael Orey, Courts Compete for High-Profile Bankruptcies,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at B1.
129. See Rovella, supra note 56, at 1.
130. At the time of our conversation in early December 2001, those involved in the Enron
filing decision did not appear to believe that the company's bankruptcy would draw front-page
headlines.
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Second, Enron could have filed in the District of Oregon. As an
Oregon corporation, Enron was entitled to file in its place of
domicile.1 31 The Enron decision team ultimately decided against an
Oregon bankruptcy filing, in large measure because that court also
lacked expertise in complex cases.
After Oregon was eliminated, the Enron decision team
considered filing a "piggy-back" bankruptcy petition in Delaware,
where the company had incorporated many of its "affiliates" and
subsidiaries. 132 They knew of the reputation of the Delaware judges
for sophistication, responsiveness, and diligence. They rejected the
Delaware court because they thought that the Delaware court was
currently too busy to give them the kind of attention and
responsiveness they needed with such a complex case.
The Enron decision team settled upon a filing in the Southern
District of New York through a process of elimination. The New York
court has sophisticated judges, arguably as sophisticated as the
Delaware judges.1 33 The New York court also had time to hear the
case. New York was convenient for the corporate managers, while
distant from the local politics and press of Houston. Finally, the Enron
decision team felt that the New York court had an institutional
memory of a ready-made template for the Enron case: the DrexelBurnham case that it had handled a decade before.1 34 The Drexel
precedent also lent an air of predictability that they felt did not exist
in other districts. With several of Enron's three thousand affiliates
and subsidiaries chartered as New York corporations, venue in that
state merely required a pro forma filing on behalf of a subsidiary.1 35
III. WHAT JUDGES THINK

While the explanations offered by lawyers as to why they are
choosing Delaware bankruptcy venue over other alternatives are
interesting on their own, they cannot alone explain a jurisdictional
competition story. Charles Tiebout encourages us to think of states as
competitors in markets for citizens, corporations, and the tax revenues

131. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000).
132. Subsection 2 of the bankruptcy venue statute permits a filing in the place where a
debtor's "affiliate" has an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. By filing a petition on behalf of an
affiliate, a debtor can "piggy-back" into virtually any jurisdiction to file its own bankruptcy
petition. Id.
133. The Southern District of New York has nine bankruptcy judges under § 152(a)(2).
134. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992).
135. § 1408(2).
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and social goods they bring with them. 136 States are, according to
Tiebout, "suppliers" of law, while citizens and corporations are
consumers of that supply. 13 7 In the Delaware venue-selection story,
then, we can think of the Delaware bench as a court competing for
cases, and the debtors' counsel that have selected Delaware venue as
having bought what they are selling. According to the lawyers
interviewed, the Delaware bankruptcy judges are "selling" predictable,
reliable, competent, and speedy service.
So, we know what the Delaware judges are selling, but our next
question must be: "Why?" Why would federal bankruptcy judges, with
no direct interest in the state government, state revenues, or even the
state bar, and with the protection afforded by fourteen-year terms,
seek to "compete" with other bankruptcy courts around the nation for
cases? The answer to this question, which I refer to as the "supply
side" of the jurisdictional competition equation, requires an inquiry
into the judicial mind-set. For this purpose, it was necessary to obtain
the thoughts of judges as to why the Delaware judges might engage in
activity that attracts cases. The question, "What is it that judges get
from providing the kind of service lawyers seek?" was put to nearly
two dozen judges. More than half of these individuals were federal
bankruptcy judges.
Almost all of the judges suggested that there is a level of
prestige and satisfaction that attaches to hearing and deciding
important cases. Some of the judges used the term "psychic income" to
refer to this prestige and satisfaction. According to one Illinois
bankruptcy judge, "Big Chapter 11 cases are interesting as well as
prestigious." He added that judges get satisfaction from overseeing
something that is vital to the nation's economy.
A chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery adds another
factor. He feels that the legal culture in Delaware is one driven by
"pride and service." "In Delaware, we believe that we are doing
something that benefits all of society, and that it is important to do
this well." He notes that Judge Walrath was appointed by the Third
Circuit as an outsider (she was a member of the Philadelphia bar)
precisely to discourage the expansion of the Delaware docket that they
had witnessed prior to her appointment. He also points to her
assimilation into the way things are done in Delaware as evidence of
what he refers to as "the psychic income from being a part of this
sophisticated and service-oriented legal culture." He feels that lawyers

136. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 421
(1956).
137. Id.

1876

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1845

and judges in Delaware feel and respond to the pressure to add value
to society. When asked why the Delaware court might attract
seemingly "boring" prepackaged bankruptcies, almost all of the judges
who thought that "psychic income" was important noted that it is a
mistake to assume that "prepacks" are boring. According to one judge,
"Many prepacks unravel after they are filed, and many of the ones
that don't involve things that the parties want to do, but shouldn't be
done through a bankruptcy filing." Another judge suggested that
judges can get satisfaction from making sure "good" prepacks make it
through, adding "if there's nothing broke, it shouldn't be fixed."
Many judges thought, however, that the significance of the
"psychic income" gained by judges handling important cases was
overstated. As one Pennsylvania bankruptcy judge said, "They pay
Judge Walrath exactly what they pay me, and it doesn't make sense to
me that I will be a better judge if I take on so many cases that I don't
have time to make thoughtful decisions." A United States district
court judge questioned the "psychic income" that flows from an
overwhelming docket. "I can't see how anyone can possibly enjoy
feeling as though they don't have time to make thoughtful decisions on
important cases."
A bankruptcy judge who had spent time handling the overflow
of cases in Delaware as a visiting judge thought that too much was
being made about the motivations of Delaware judges. First, he noted
that although motions to transfer venue were infrequent, "both
bankruptcy judges seemed receptive to motions to transfer venue." He
added that "the Delaware judges do not think they are better able to
handle Chapter 11 cases than other bankruptcy judges." According to
this judge, in a recent eighteen-month period, the Delaware
bankruptcy judges "heard nineteen motions to transfer venue, and
seventeen of them were granted." He felt that this demonstrated that
the Delaware judges see themselves as simply "doing their jobs," and
not making a name for themselves. Another bankruptcy judge agreed.
"They get the cases and they hear them, because that is what they are
supposed to do."
IV. Is DELAWARE BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION?

It is clear that a number of factors, according to the lawyers
interviewed, have driven cases toward Delaware, and that this may
have provided Delaware with a sustainable advantage in expertise.
The more complex cases the Delaware court hears, the more
sophistication they may gain from the experience. It may be a
mistake, however, to view the path-dependent entrenchment of the
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District of Delaware as a bad thing. If these judges have developed
socially valuable human capital that can be tapped to produce shorter,
less costly, and more efficient reorganization proceedings, then
perhaps we should encourage the move toward Delaware. If the abovementioned Delaware chancery judge is correct about the motivations
of the judges and the impact of Delaware's legal culture, Congress
ought to consider expanding the Delaware bankruptcy bench to
accommodate the ever-expanding docket. 138 The legal culture will then
produce additional sophisticated bankruptcy judges.
What is less clear is whether the shift to Delaware is actually a
form of jurisdictional competition of the type that generates the social
benefits argued to result from federalism. 139 If it is, then judges in
other districts, particularly Nevada and New York, have an incentive
to compete with Delaware judges for these same cases, and society
ought to benefit from this competition. But before we start to cheer
about competition for bankruptcy venue, we ought to look at the
responses of lawyers and judges and ask whether what they have
described is a form of jurisdictional competition that we recognize and
value.
A. A Review of the JurisdictionalCompetition Debate-Why
Motives Matter
The arguments on both sides of the jurisdictional competition
debate are well rehearsed and familiar. It is an old debate, but its
modern incarnation can be said to have originated in 1956 with the
publication of Charles Tiebout's seminal article, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures. 40 Tiebout suggested that states be thought of as
producers of law in a competitive market for citizens and the revenue
they bring. In 1966, Grant McConnell's now classic critique of
American federalism, Private Power and American Democracy,
challenged the logic underlying the application of a competitive
market model to the relationships between states, as well as between
states and the federal government. 1 4 1 In 1974, William Cary moved
the debate into the realm of corporate law, by asserting that charter
competition between the states results in a "race to the bottom," with

138. See supra Part III.
139. For an explication of the social benefits arising from federalism, see G. Marcus Cole,
The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 242-43 (2000)
(explaining how federalism facilitated the Great Migration of African Americans away from the
Jim Crow legal regimes in the southern United States).
140. See Tiebout, supra note 136, at 416.
141. GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 101-18 (1966).
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states adopting manager-friendly laws to attract corporations. 142
Ralph Winter joined the debate with the argument that, while
managers may be self-interested, market forces drive them to be
responsive to investors. 143 This leads managers to seek efficient
regulation, and states, in competition with each other to supply this
efficient regulation, engage in a "race to the top.' ' 44 In this manner,
jurisdictions can be said to compete with each other to attract
corporate charters, citizens, and the revenues that they bring with

them. 145
According to both Tiebout and Winter, in the debate over
whether the jurisdictional competition between states leads to a race
to the bottom or to the top, motives matter. Delaware is driven by the
pecuniary interests of its bar, as well as the desire to generate
146
revenues, to provide the "public good" of efficient organization law.
Corporate decisionmakers are motivated by the desire to capture the
"Delaware premium" that share value enjoys under the authority of
efficient corporate governance legal regimes, which in turn allows
them to reap the private benefits that inure to managers of highperforming companies. 147 We can think of all participants in the
jurisdictional competition story, then, as acting out of enlightened selfinterest in the market for law. States, as suppliers of organizational
law, are responsive to the desires of the consumers of organizational
law, namely firm managers and investors.
B. Is the Delawarizationof CorporateBankruptcy a Story of
JurisdictionalCompetition?
The flow of Chapter 11 cases to Delaware has brought with it
the debate over jurisdictional competition. The arguments over the
beneficence of the Delawarization of bankruptcy are much the same as
those that attached to the debate over Delaware's position in the
corporate charter race. Is the move toward Delaware venue in
bankruptcy a race to the bottom? Or does the domicile option in
bankruptcy's venue provision facilitate beneficial competition?
142. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
143. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977).

144. Id.
145. See Tiebout, supra note 136, at 1120-24.
146. ROMANO, supra note 1, at 6.
147. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 533,
555 (2001) (finding that Delaware firms were worth 5% more in 1996, on average, and received
more takeover bids than firms incorporated elsewhere).
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1. The "Race to the Bottom" Arguments of the Skeptics
The critics of the logarithmic expansion of the Delaware
bankruptcy docket point to two reasons for the phenomenon. First,
they claim that Delaware is chosen because it is corporate debtorfriendly. 148 This posture has led, in the eyes of the Delaware Skeptics,
to an unseemly laxity among the judges in Delaware with regard to
prepackaged bankruptcies as well as traditional Chapter 11 plans of
reorganization. 149 In the minds of the Skeptics, the Delaware judges
would rubber-stamp any plan of reorganization that a corporate
debtor placed in front of them.
In an effort to prove this assertion of laxity on the part of the
Delaware bankruptcy bench, Professors LoPucki and Kalin conducted
an empirical analysis of Chapter 11 plans filed in Delaware by large,
publicly held corporate debtors. 150 LoPucki and Kalin point to the high
"refiling" rate among Delaware Chapter 11 cases as evidence that the
process fails when it is done in Delaware. 151 According to their study, a
firm that reorganizes in Delaware is four times as likely to file a
second bankruptcy petition as is a firm that reorganizes in another

jurisdiction. 152
Professors Rasmussen and Thomas point out several
difficulties with the LoPucki and Kalin' study, including its failure to
distinguish between traditional Chapter 11 petitions and prepackaged
plans, and that it draws a negative inference from refiling when none
is necessarily justified. 53 They demonstrate that the optimal refiling
rate is probably not zero, given that there are costs that attach to the
effort and time required to achieve a zero refiling rate. 154 Professor
Skeel adds that the higher Delaware refiling rate may be due to a selfselection bias: firms selecting Delaware venue may have a more
complicated capital structure and, concomitantly, a more complicated
restructuring.' 5 5 He also notes that firms choosing Delaware may also
56
be the ones with the most serious business problems.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

LoPucki & Kahn, supra note 10, at 233-34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 22, at 283.

154. Id. at 296-97.

155. Skeel, supra note 72, at 319.
156. Id. at 320.

1880

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1845

Whether or not LoPucki and Kalin are right about the
significance of refiling rates, they view the venue-selection process as
157
a "race to the bottom."'
2. The "Glass is Half Full" Arguments of the Enthusiasts
The Delaware Enthusiasts see the rise of Delaware bankruptcy
venue quite differently. Professor Skeel, for example, cites the "virtues
of Delaware": speedy and efficient handling of corporate bankruptcy
proceedings by expert judges within a professional and responsive
judicial culture. 58 These virtues, according to Skeel, produce what he
refers to as a "clientele effect."1 59 Professors Rasmussen and Thomas
point to another Delaware benefit: an encouragement of consensual
solutions to corporate restructuring needs.1 60 The Enthusiasts point to
the central economic purpose of bankruptcy law, to reduce the cost of
credit ex ante, and creditor preference for Delaware, both ex ante and
ex post, as evidence of Delaware's efficiency. 161 After all, they argue,
creditors would not prefer a court that raised the cost of credit,
162
particularly after all of the credit-pricing decisions had been made.
Although the Enthusiasts acknowledge that the competition for
bankruptcy venue is not directly parallel to that for corporate
charters, they point to these benefits and embrace "the glass as half
full."163
C. Why the JurisdictionalCompetition Debate Doesn't Fit
1. "Delaware is Not a State; It's a District."
The debate over the Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy is
taking place in the shadow of the continuing debate over the
Delawarization of corporate law. Delaware Skeptics LoPucki and
Kalin dismiss any claim that the phenomenon is "federalist."'164 But
LoPucki and Kalin, by their recognition of the distinctions between
the structures involved in the bankruptcy version of the debate and
dismissal of "federalist" arguments, fail to consider the possibility that
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

LoPucki & Kahn, supra note 10, at 272.
Skeel, supra note 71, at 27.
Id
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 22, at 287.
Skeel, supra note 71, at 27.
Id.; see also Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8,at 1397.
Skeel, supra note 71, at 26.
See LoPucki & Kahn, supra note 10, at 267-68.

2002]

"DELAWARE IS NOTA STATE"

1881

a nonfederalist type of competition might be taking place in Delaware.
Delaware Enthusiast Skeel likewise acknowledges the differences
between bankruptcy's Delawarization and the corporate charter
race. 165 He also acknowledges that these differences attenuate the
benefits we may derive from this competition, but he prefers to see the
"glass as half full, rather than half empty." 166 Nevertheless, both the
Skeptics and Enthusiasts frame their arguments in the "race to the
bottom" and "race to the top" terms associated with jurisdictional
competition and the corporate charter debate.
One San Francisco bankruptcy lawyer, when presented with
the arguments on both sides of the Delawarization debate, responded
emphatically: 'You're talking as though Delaware is a state. Delaware
is NOT a state; it's a district. For purposes of bankruptcy, Delaware is
16 7
a district."
To illustrate his point, he provided an example of a case that
could have been filed in Wilmington (the District of Delaware), in
Sacramento (the Eastern District of California), or with a little
creativity, in Oakland (the Northern District of California). All of the
considerations
suggested that, although the company was
headquartered in Sacramento, an Oakland or Delaware filing would
have been preferable. In the end, he chose Oakland over both
Delaware and Sacramento. "I made sure I had a good enough
argument to steer clear of Rule 11, and because most of the big
creditors were San Francisco banks, I knew I wasn't likely to get a
motion to switch venue to Sacramento."
The San Francisco attorney's observation may suggest why the
jurisdictional competition terminology provides such an uncomfortable
fit in the context of bankruptcy venue. The choice of venue takes place
between districts of the federal court system, not between states.
Many of the potentially competing districts that might be in
competition with each other are within the same state. This fact
makes it unclear whether a state, if it could influence the process,
would act on behalf of one district or all of them. Would California
attempt to attract cases to the Northern District, even at the expense
of its Eastern District? Or might California take actions that make all
of its districts more attractive?
These questions presume that states can take steps to make
their federal bankruptcy courts more attractive. This is quite a
presumption. Delaware, as a state, is limited in its capacity to

165. Skeel, supra note 71, at 26.
166. Id.

167. Emphasis is noted as spoken by interviewee.
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influence the competition between bankruptcy courts. Although
Delaware can structure its organization law to make its bankruptcy
venue available to as many companies as choose to file charters in its
Secretary of State's office, there is no bankruptcy equivalent of the
internal-affairs doctrine that guarantees that its own law will apply in
cases filed outside its borders. 168 Bankruptcy judges are appointed by
the federal circuit overseeing the district, and an appointee need have
no prior relationship to the bar or even to the state in which she
sits.169 Although the appointment process is typically administered by
a committee, the lawyers comprising such committees are commonly
drawn from districts throughout the circuit. 170 States have little
influence on the selection of their bankruptcy judges.
The limitation on state influence in bankruptcy is not
restricted to judicial appointments. States are handcuffed at the level
of substantive law as well. Bankruptcy law is, for the most part,
federal, and while state substantive law plays an important role, the
relevant state law need not have a connection with the bankruptcy
venue. 17 1 States can influence bankruptcy legislation at the national
level through their federal congressional delegations, but unless these
representatives are well placed, any one state is unlikely to turn
federal law to its own peculiar advantage. In short, if a state is to
succeed in the battle for bankruptcy venue, it cannot depend upon
judicial selection and legislation.
Even if Delaware were to win a competition for bankruptcy
venue, what would it win? If we think of jurisdictional competition in
the terms encouraged by Tiebout and Winter, the debate surrounding
the Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy seems odd. For Tiebout,
competition is between jurisdictions within the market for law. 172 Like
other markets, the market for law has a supply side and a demand
side. Within the Tiebout model, jurisdictions are "suppliers" of law,
while individuals, corporations, and the lawyers that represent them
are "consumers" of law.1 73 On the demand side of the jurisdictional
competition equation, individuals, corporations, and their lawyers
168. The internal-affairs doctrine is the traditional choice-of-law rule that directs courts to
look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine the basic rights and duties applicable to
a particular corporation. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The
ProperLaw of a Corporation,44 BUS. LAW. 693, 702-09 (1989).
169. 28 U.S.C § 152 (2000).
170. Each circuit has its own procedures for appointing bankruptcy judges.
171. See Skeel, supra note 71, at 26. For an argument that bankruptcy law, as enacted under
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, is in reality state substantive law within a federal procedural
framework, see Cole, supra note 139, at 236-44.
172. Tiebout, supra note 136, at 421.
173. Id.
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seek the most advantageous regime, the one with the most "desirable"
law. When coupled with the constitutional right of interstate travel,
individuals and corporations can be thought to consume law by "voting
174
with their feet."
It is the supply side of the jurisdictional competition equation
that gives Tiebout competition its name, however. Tiebout competition
involves a tussle between jurisdictions for revenue. Jurisdictions
generate revenue through the development of "desirable" law. 175 A
jurisdiction fosters the development of desirable organization law
through its careful selection of state legislators and judges. 176 In the
corporate charter race, for example, Delaware is widely regarded as
having nurtured responsive and sophisticated legislators and judges
interested in preserving the state's status as the leader in corporate
charters. 177
It is this supply side of the jurisdictional competition equation
that makes it a poor description of the Delawarization of bankruptcy.
Although the State of Delaware enjoys borders that are contiguous
with those of its federal court district, the state cannot generate
revenue directly from the production of desirable bankruptcy law for
two reasons. First, the state does not receive direct compensation from
the debtor's choice to file a petition in the bankruptcy court that sits
there. Lawyers from out of town must stay and eat somewhere, and
the Delawarization of bankruptcy must be good for the hospitality
trade in Wilmington. But the tax revenues generated by hotel and
restaurant guests pale in comparison to those realized in the corporate
charter race. 178 Much, if not most, of the pecuniary benefits associated
with bankruptcy venue accrue to local counsel. Even these indirect
benefits to the Delaware bar are diluted by the influx of bankruptcy
lawyers from national law firms that have opened offices in
Wilmington to satisfy the local counsel requirement. Second, even if
Delaware could realize revenue by supplying desirable bankruptcy
law, its ability to increase revenue through bankruptcy venue is
severely limited. As noted earlier, bankruptcy law is, for the most
part, federal law. Delaware cannot produce better bankruptcy law, in
part because it cannot supply responsive legislators and judges. In

174. See Cole, supra note 139, at 251.
175. See ROMANO, supra note 1, at 4-6; see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discriminationin the Market for CorporateLaw, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1211-14 (2001).
176. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 175, at 1212-14.
177. ROMANO, supra note 1, at 9.
178. One source estimates that Delaware receives, on average, nearly 15.5% of its operating
budget from corporate charter filing fees. See id. at 8.
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terms of jurisdictional competition, Delaware's supply of desirable law
is relatively inelastic.
2. Inelasticity of Supply of the District of Delaware Judges
In the 1942 motion picture Casablanca,the protagonist ran a
nightclub by the name of "Rick's Caf6 Americain" in the refugee haven
of unoccupied French Morocco. 179 It was said of the caf6 that "sooner or
later, everyone comes to Rick's.' 8 0 It was also said that "Rick's
wouldn't be Rick's without Sam."''1 In much the same way, we can
think of the District of Delaware as the Caf6 Americain of bankruptcy.
It might seem as though sooner or later, virtually all large
reorganizations will take place in that venue. But the empirical
evidence suggests that Delaware would not be Delaware without
Walsh and Walrath. The responses of lawyers and judges to the
questions of why lawyers might choose Delaware, and why judges
might want these cases, reflect a common understanding: Lawyers
primarily choose judges, not courts or legal regimes. It is true that the
lawyer's choices may be characterized as a preference for particular
procedures or predictable exercises of judicial discretion, but these
preferences often manifest themselves as a preference for particular
judges. Lawyers prefer the way in which the Delaware bench-first
Judge Balick, and then Judges Walsh and Walrath-has managed and
decided cases. And they will get to exercise this choice, so long as: (1)
Judges Walsh and Walrath continue to sit on the Delaware
bankruptcy bench; (2) Judges Walsh and Walrath are not so
overburdened by cases that new cases get assigned to visiting judges;
(3) Judges Walsh and Walrath are not supplemented by congressional
addition of seats to the Delaware bankruptcy bench, and Third Circuit
appointments to those seats; and (4) Congress does not alter or
eliminate the "domicile" venue option.
The purpose of the foregoing "parade of horribles" is to point
out the systemic helplessness of Delaware in the Delawarization of
corporate bankruptcy. While Delaware's status as a district does not,
by itself, preclude it from engaging in jurisdictional competition with
other districts, the structure of federal court districts severely limits
the potential for such competition. Virtually all of the supply-side
decisionmaking authority rests in the hands of two judges (and, to
some extent, their superiors), while virtually all of the supply-side
gains are enjoyed (or visited upon) those same two judges.
179. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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What is more, these judges are only human. Unlike Delaware
corporate law, the human capital of the supply side of the
jurisdictional competition equation is exhaustible. Delaware corporate
law can be said to be similar to a "public good," because it can be
18 2
supplied to additional consumers at negligible marginal cost.
Bankruptcy judges, to the contrary, are neither inexhaustible nor
nonexclusive. At some point, and it is quite possible that point has
already been reached, the supply of the services that lawyers are
seeking through Delaware venue can no longer be provided. A judge
can be too busy or too tired to handle yet another case.
Bankruptcy judges are also, for purposes of hearing cases,
exclusive. A judge cannot be at two hearings at the same time. While
the Delaware judges have, by all accounts, performed a masterful
juggling act, every new case limits the availability of the judge for any
other matter. The humanity of the bankruptcy judge, even the
Delaware bankruptcy judge, is a real limitation on further expansion
of the supply of Walsh and Walrath to the lawyers that crave them. In
economic terms, at some point the supply of what lawyers want from
Delaware venue becomes increasingly inelastic.
The above discussion is not to suggest that Delaware venue,
per se, is limited. Any number of corporations can charter in
Delaware, and any number of those that do can file bankruptcy
petitions there. But the purpose of selecting Delaware venue is
defeated if the form is not accompanied by the substance provided by
Judges Walsh and Walrath. It is this limitation on the desired supply
that demonstrates that the Delawarization of bankruptcy venue is not
a story of jurisdictional competition in the sense meant by Tiebout.
But if we are not witnessing jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy,
then why is the Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy taking place?
The answer may be that we are witnessing a heretofore unrecognized
form of competition, one we might think of as "professional
competition."

182. The idea that Delaware corporate law is a public good has gained wide acceptance. See,
e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009, 1097 (1997). Delaware corporate law is not a true public good as that term has
come to be defined by neoclassical economists, since each additional corporation imposes some
small marginal cost on the state. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 175, at 1214.
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V. PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION IN BANKRUPTCY

A. Professionalsand the Professionalizationof the Bankruptcy Bench
The
preceding
discussion
demonstrates
that
the
Delawarization of bankruptcy law is not typical jurisdictional
competition, as described by Charles Tiebout, to which we have
become accustomed in the more familiar setting of the corporate
charter race.18 3 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the
absence of Tiebout competition implies the absence of competition for
bankruptcy petitions. Some type of competition is taking place with
regard to bankruptcy venue. What kind of competition is it?
The explanations offered by the lawyers in Part II may provide
some insight into the nature of the competition we are witnessing in
the Delawarization of bankruptcy venue. Recall the various factors
listed by lawyers, in order of declining importance. The most
important factor, predictability, is a characterization of both the
probability associated with drawing a particular judge, as well as how
she is likely to exercise her discretion once drawn. 8 4 This factor, then,
is more a matter of which judge is drawn rather than in which district
she happens to sit. Likewise, the third factor, namely the
sophistication of the judges, can be thought of as a personal, rather
than a territorial, quality. 8 5 It is true that attorneys' fee applications

are circumscribed by local rules and the scrutiny exercised by the
United States Trustee, but even here, the final word on their award
rests with the judge. 8 6 Although the responsiveness of a particular
judge is clearly a personal trait, even factors as seemingly impersonal
as creditor pressure or the intrusiveness of the home trustee can be
linked to the deference or leeway a judge or potential judge might
permit those non-debtors within the context of Chapter 11
proceedings. In short, virtually all of the factors listed by the lawyers
making the venue-selection decision are considerations revolving
around the personal characteristics of bankruptcy judges. Lawyers are
primarily selecting judges, not districts.
If the lawyers involved in the venue-selection decision are
selecting judges, two questions must follow. First, why might a federal
bankruptcy judge, with no material gain associated with docket size,
want to attract cases and increase her workload? Even if we arrive at
an answer to this first question, we are still confronted with a second:
183. Tiebout, supra note 136, at 421.
184. See supra Part H.A.1.

185. See supra Part II.A.4.
186. See supra Part II.A.6.
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Why have the judges in the District of Delaware succeeded in
attracting cases from their colleagues in other districts?
The first question, which might be restated as "Why might
federal judges work harder when they don't have to?," is not a difficult
one for many close observers of the federal judiciary. One such
observer, Richard Posner, himself a federal judge, might attribute the
behavior we observe in the bankruptcy venue race to the
"professionalization" of federal bankruptcy judges.1 8 7 In his book, The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Judge Posner documents
what he heralds as the "growing professionalism of law."188 By
"professionalism," Posner has in mind a very specific meaning: the
performance of "an occupation of considerable public importance the
practice of which requires highly specialized, even esoteric, knowledge
that can be acquired only by specialized formal education or a
carefully supervised apprenticeship." 18 9 What is important, from
Posner's perspective, is a generally held belief that the practitioners of
the occupation possess unique skill or knowledge, regardless of
whether this belief is accurate.1 90
Posner distinguishes between "bad" professionalism and "good"
professionalism.' 91 The "bad" form of professionalism, according to
Judge Posner, exists when there is an unjustified belief that the
specified group possesses unique ability. 192 This bad form of
professionalism characterized the practice of law for centuries, and
was typified by an obscurantist style of discourse, screening of
prospective entrants through general and specialized educational
requirements,
cultivation
of
charismatic
personality,
underspecialization,
lack
of hierarchy,
altruistic
pretense,
93
anticompetitiveness, and a resistance to algorithmic duplication.
Posner asserts that law was once a prototype of this cartel-like form of
194
professionalism but has evolved away from it.
The practice of law, according to Posner, has become more
professional in a good sense. 95 Law has become increasingly
specialized, hierarchical, and intensely competitive. 96 To their credit,

187. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 190 (1999).

188. Id.
189. Id. at 186.
190. Id. at 187.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 187-89.
194. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 23 (1995).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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lawyers and judges have employed the findings of empirical research
in the social sciences to further the enterprise of law. 197 Lawyers,
according to Posner, are keeping their economic status in society by
trading "professional mystique" for genuine hard work and useful
service. 198 He points to judges in particular as exemplars of the new
professionalism that has swept through law. 199 There are specialized
courts and even courts of general jurisdiction with members noted for
particular expertise. 200 There is hierarchy within courts that did not
exist before the advent of law clerks, staff attorneys, interns, and
externs. 20 1 Judges themselves have responded to the increased
professionalism of the lawyers that practice before them by becoming
20 2
increasingly sophisticated, learned, and hardworking.
But why have the judges responded to legal practitioners by
building human capital, relinquishing leisure time, and assuming
burdensome dockets? Jonathan Macey explains this behavior as
motivated by a simple economic calculus: judges prefer hard work to
20 3
being reversed upon appeal and the concomitant stigma of reversal.
Posner suggests that the costs of hard work are willingly borne by
judges in exchange for other enhancements to their welfare that they
prefer. 20 4 According to him, judges are self-interested actors who seek
to maximize their influence, prestige, reputation, and personal
enjoyment and satisfaction. 20 5 These welfare enhancements are
achievable in the modern, sophisticated legal environment through
hard work, increased specialization, and all of the other earmarks that
Posner associates with the "good" professionalism trend. 206
Other close observers of the federal judiciary have taken notice
of these trends but have expressed dissatisfaction with the simple
economic explanations for the increased professionalism of federal
judges. Some Law and Economics scholars, such as David Skeel and
Robert Cooter, have pointed to the failure of neoclassical assumptions
regarding self-interested motivation to explain the behavior of the

197. POSNER, supra note 187, at 204-05.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 192.
202. Id.
203. Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 110-11 (1989).
204. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13-15, 31 (1994).
205. Id. at 13-15.
206. Id.
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federal judiciary. 20 7 According to Skeel, "Public choice theorists have
had far more difficulty modeling ...judges' behavior, as compared to
legislators and private economic actors, due to the absence of a
compelling theory as to what . . . judges maximize. '"208 Cooter
acknowledges that "economists have not had much success in creating
20 9
a theory to explain the objectives of public judges."
Professor Lynn Stout has attributed the seemingly inexplicable
diligence of federal judges to altruism. 210 Unlike the altruistic
pretense that Posner associates with "bad" professionalism, Stout
finds genuine altruism to be both helpful as an explanatory
description of the selfless behavior exhibited by federal judges and
consistent with sociological and psychological evidence of altruism in
other human settings. 211 De-emphasizing motivations, Stout asserts
2 12
that judges display "other-regarding revealed preferences."
According to Stout, whatever their motivations, judges act as though
they care, not just about their own costs and benefits, but about the
costs and benefits of their actions as borne by others. 2 13 Included in
Stout's concept of "others" are litigants, the economy, the rule of law,
214
and even ideals of proper judicial conduct.
The concept of professionalism appears to capture the ways in
which bankruptcy judges are viewed by lawyers and by other judges.
Lawyers interviewed used the terms "hardworking," "competent,"
"sophisticated," and "savvy" numerous times to characterize the work
of District of Delaware Judges Walsh and Walrath. Lawyers also
referred frequently to the specialization that these two judges have
achieved with respect to large, complex Chapter 11 cases. Whether
these qualities are motivated by altruism or highly particularized
preferences, the evidence provided by the bankruptcy bar suggests
that Judges Walsh and Walrath have achieved professional excellence.

207. Id.; see also Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB.
CHOICE 107, 129 (1983).
208. David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal
Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 n.19 (1997) (book review).
209. Cooter, supra note 207, at 128-29.
210. Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic.Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1609
(2002).
211. Id. at 1607.
212. Id. at 1610.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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B. The DelawareInfluence on ProfessionalBankruptcy
Judges: "ProfessionalCompetition"
The competition for bankruptcy cases can be thought of as
"professional competition"-a race between professionals to perform
their services effectively and efficiently, without regard to tangible
rewards or compensation for their superior service. The observation
that judges are competing with each other to deliver their professional
services leads to yet another simple question: Why? Why is it not
enough for judges to perform to the best of their abilities? Why must
they engage in a race for complex, demanding cases, and why have the
two that sit in the District of Delaware won this race?
While the discussion of Tiebout competition in Part IV
emphasizes the formal, systemic helplessness of the State of Delaware
in the competition between federal bankruptcy judges and districts, it
is a mistake to conclude that institutional helplessness is equivalent
to actual helplessness. As several Delaware attorneys and state court
judges emphasized, Delaware's legal environment is characterized by
"a culture of service." According to one Delaware chancellor, "lawyers
and judges in this state see themselves as part of something critical to
the well-being of the country, and even the world." Wilmington's legal
culture, according to him, leads "lawyers and judges in Delaware to
provide service that is hard to find anywhere else."
To influence the federal professionals who are beyond the reach
of Delaware electoral politics, Delaware puts its culture to work,
aligning the interests of the professional judges with those of the
community. As one Delaware corporate lawyer put it, "When Enron
filed its bankruptcy in New York, the front page of the Wilmington
newspaper read 'Enron chooses New York Over Delaware.' Where else
could you read a headline like that?" According to this lawyer, the
Delaware legal community is painfully aware of bankruptcy venue
decisions.
To emphasize the strength of Delaware's service culture, one
nationally prominent Ohio bankruptcy attorney recounted his
experience locating a multibillion-dollar settlement trust:
I was busy attempting to get opinion letters from various state attorneys general to
assure me that location of the trust in their state would not subject our trust to state
taxes. When a Delaware corporate lawyer got wind of our efforts, he called up a friend in
the Delaware legislature, and within three months, Delaware actually put a law on its
books exempting us from taxation. The difference was that in Delaware we were fully
protected by statute, when it took even longer to get the partial protection of an attorney
general's letter in other states.

Another lawyer, based in Delaware, reported his experience
with the Delaware culture at the highest levels of state government. "I
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had a client who had, for a number of reasons, decided to recharter in
Nevada. When the Governor (of Delaware) heard of the company's
decision, he actually got on the phone and invited the general counsel
to lunch. By the time lunch was over, the company was a Delaware
corporation again."
Delaware's service culture goes beyond the legislative and
executive branches of government. It infects the judges as well,
including those on the federal bench. One Delaware corporate lawyer
explained, "Wilmington is a really small community. Everybody knows
everybody else. If these bankruptcy judges wanted to buck the system,
they would find life in Delaware very unpleasant and lonely. It's just
not reasonable to expect them to act differently than all of the other
lawyers and judges here."
It follows, then, that the State of Delaware is not an irrelevant
variable in the bankruptcy venue equation. It is true that Delaware
does not have direct influence over bankruptcy law or the appointment
of bankruptcy judges. But Delaware's influence cannot be explained
away so easily. The move toward Delaware venue is likely the product
of the indirect but extended influence that Delaware law and culture
have on anything that comes near it. That culture, according to one
Delaware corporate lawyer, is one of "service and responsiveness." He
added that "as a legal community, we will 'out serve' any other legal
environment in the world in order to keep companies here, and keep
them happy."
The use of the phrase "out serve" points to another element of
Delaware's legal culture, namely "competition." Delaware lawyers see
themselves in competition with other communities for the services
they provide. According to another Delaware corporate lawyer,
"Wilmington is a one-industry town, and we know how our bread is
buttered." It is this understanding, according to this attorney, that
permeates "everything we do." He also insisted that this
understanding is so prevalent that it rises to the level of an unspoken
understanding between all members of the legal community.
Delaware lawyers who were asked about how Delaware's legal
culture could reach seemingly immune federal bankruptcy judges all
responded emphatically that no judge could be immune. According to
one lawyer, "This is where they live, this is where they shop on the
weekends, and where their kids go to school. They can't just opt out of
this community." Another lawyer said, "We all know each other and
see each other all the time," adding "We go to the same parties,
dinners, restaurants. If a judge was bucking the Delaware way of
doing things, the disapproval would be a real part of their lives." One
Delaware state court judge cited the fact that Judge Walrath was
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appointed with the widely recognized intention to limit the influence
of Delaware on corporate bankruptcy. "As soon as she was sworn in,
she became one of us."
Bankruptcy lawyers praise the effect of the Delaware service
culture upon Delaware bankruptcy judges. According to one
bankruptcy lawyer who recently moved his practice from New York to
Wilmington, "Delaware legal professionals take great pride in what
they do. They see it as something that is important, not just for
Delaware, but for the economy, the country, and the world." According
to a Delaware Chancery Court judge, the satisfaction received from
performing such an important service provides immeasurable "psychic
income" to Delaware's judicial professionals.
Delaware's influence on the bankruptcy bench can be viewed as
a social science experiment. Bankruptcy law, with its national reach
and uniformity, establishes a control. Federal bankruptcy judges
around the country are paid exactly the same and hold the same
position within the federal judicial hierarchy, as any other bankruptcy
judge in any other district. 215 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure are the same in all districts, as is the Bankruptcy Code of
1978. What differs from district to district are the judges themselves
and the ways in which they exercise their discretion.
The cultural influence of Delaware appears to explain the part
of the story that is missing from an analysis of the formal institutions
alone. Judges in Delaware are influenced by Delaware's culture to act
responsively and predictably. The cultural explanation makes sense of
the assimilation of Judge Walrath, purportedly appointed to buck that
very culture. It also suggests more permanence to Delaware's perch
atop the bankruptcy venue totem than a view of the formal
institutions might lead one to forecast.
The reach of Delaware culture is more than superficial. It
motivates professional judges to develop substantive innovations that
provide them with a competitive edge. Such innovation may explain
the growth of "prepackaged" plans within the Delaware docket.
"Prepackaged" plans necessarily provide for the management of the
reorganized companies as well as for the distribution of ownership
stakes. The management of a reorganized firm can be thought of as a
deployment decision, in that it represents how assets are deployed.
Ownership interests, however, are independent of deployment, and
can be thought of as allocation determinations. There is no necessary
relationship between who owns assets and how they are used. The
increase in the number of "prepackaged" plans in the Delaware docket
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2000).
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may reflect a market determination about the use of judicial oversight
and discretion. Creditors and debtors may be filing "prepackaged"
plans in Delaware because they may believe that Delaware judges are
less likely to interfere with deployment determinations, reserving
judgment for questions of allocation. Market participants may view
Delaware judges as deferential to the business judgment of managers
and creditors. These market participants also see the Delaware judges
as limiting the exercise of judicial intervention to questions of equity.
If this is an accurate characterization of what the Delaware judges are
doing, then their actions are consistent with the calls for such
bifurcation that have come from the law and economics literature over
216
the past decade.
That Delaware's legal culture influences bankruptcy judges
and, ultimately, bankruptcy venue decisions is probably not
surprising. The real question with respect to Delaware, its culture,
and professional competition is why, in a state as legally purposive as
Delaware, would its bar and its officials care to influence cases that
bring little more than restaurant receipts and an influx of bankruptcy
lawyers? The answer may lie in an understanding of what bankruptcy
venue preserves rather than in what it attracts.
The influence of Delaware's legal culture on professional
bankruptcy judges can be seen as a collateral effect of its victory in the
corporate charter race. Companies win the right to file for bankruptcy
in Delaware as part of the bundle of advantages associated with being
chartered there. As long as Delaware is viewed as the "best" place to
file a Chapter 11 petition, then few companies will look twice at the
premium enjoyed through the decision to charter there. Once
bankruptcy venue in another district becomes viewed as superior to
that in Delaware, then the Delaware premium becomes offset, to some
extent, by the potential "cost" of Delaware bankruptcy. Delaware
corporate lawyers, then, have an interest in ensuring that Delaware
bankruptcy is a "benefit," and not a "cost," of chartering a corporation
in that state, and Delaware's powerful United States Senators have an
interest in resisting reform of the current venue regime.
C. ProfessionalCompetition vs. JurisdictionalCompetition
It is not immediately obvious that Delaware ought to win a
competition between professional federal judges sitting within its
borders and those situated elsewhere. The professional competition for
216. The most recent calls for such a bifurcation of function have been made by Douglas
Baird and Robert Rasmussen. See The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002)
(manuscript on file with author).
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bankruptcy venue enjoys characteristics that differ from those we find
in customary jurisdictional competition. These differences are rooted
in the motivations driving the competitors, the role of geography, the
durability of victory, and the economic character of the supply
provided by competitors.
1. Personal Interests vs. Joint Interests
The first and most obvious difference between the type of
competition in the race for corporate charters and that in the race for
bankruptcy venue resides in the interests driving the competition. In
jurisdictional competition, states like Delaware compete against
Nevada and New York because success directly promotes the interests
of state decisionmakers. Delaware legislators share the bounty
generated by charter filing fees through enhanced state budgets, and
Delaware state court judges enjoy a level of prestige and notoriety not
shared by their counterparts in other states. The Delaware bar shares
in the lucre, gaining exclusive rights to represent more and wealthier
corporate clients. As one Delaware attorney put it, "When we keep a
company in Delaware, or when we get a new one, everybody wins."
In contrast, professional competition is apparently driven by
the personal interests of the competitors. Whether judges are
maximizing prestige and influence or satisfaction at "just doing their
jobs," the direct benefits of success in a race between professionals
inure to the professional. This is not to say that jurisdictional interests
are not implicated in professional competition; they clearly are. As the
above discussion of Delaware's influence should make clear, the joint
interests of Delaware residents drive them to influence indirectly the
professional competition in bankruptcy.
2. Geographic Flexibility vs. Territorial Fixation
A second difference between professional competition and
jurisdictional competition involves the reliance upon geography.
Professionals need not be tied to any particular territorial restriction.
Even professional federal bankruptcy judges are less territorially tied
than most observers might realize. As noted earlier, Judge Judith K.
Fitzgerald of the Western District of Pennsylvania hears the consumer
bankruptcy cases in Wilmington. 2 17 This placement occurs because
bankruptcy judges within any particular federal appeals court circuit
serve at the pleasure of the United States court of appeals for that

217. See supra Part IV.
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circuit. 218 The normal duties of the bankruptcy judge in the Southern
District of Alabama, for example, entail regular sittings in Pensacola,
Florida. 219 And while it is generally true that bankruptcy judges are
bound at the very least by the water's edge of their respective circuits,
the parade of visiting judges to sit in Wilmington provides evidence
that even this general rule has its exceptions. In the absence of even
loose territorial limitations, one might imagine professionals
competing without regard to geographic territory.
Jurisdictional competition, on the other hand, enjoys less
geographic flexibility. For some consumers, Florida law will always
have the assistance of Florida weather. Yet jurisdictional competition
in the context of corporate law is not as territorially limited as tort or
property regimes. The internal-affairs doctrine and other choice-of-law
rules can give Delaware law reach far beyond its borders. Much of
Delaware's success in the race for corporate charter and franchise tax
revenues is a product of the extraterritorial availability of Delaware
incorporation and its benefits.
3. Competitiveness
The geographic flexibility inherent in professional competition
points to a third important distinguishing trait. Because of this
flexibility, markets for professional services are likely to prove more
competitive than those for jurisdictional legal regimes. The corporate
charter race provides a tangible illustration of this point. Delaware
has been the leader in this race since it snatched the title from New
Jersey in 1919.220 Once it achieved preeminence, the state moved to
reinforce its position by developing a body of law and an infrastructure
2 21
focused on becoming the most attractive locale for filing a charter.
In and out of eight decades, many things have changed in Delaware: it
has had eighteen governors, 222 twenty-four members of the Court of

218. § 152(a)(1) (providing that each circuit of the United States court of appeals shall
appoint all bankruptcy judges within its circuit).
219. Many other district courts engage in sharing arrangements that involve the movement
of bankruptcy judges across district and even state lines for administrative convenience.
220. ROMANO, supra note 1, at 5.
221. Id.
222. These governors were John G. Townsend, Jr. (1917-1921), William D. Denney (19211925), Robert P. Robinson (1925-1929), C. Douglass Buck (1929-1937), Richard Cann McMullen
(1937-1941), Walter W. Bacon (1941-1949), Elbert N. Carvel (1949-1953), J. Caleb Boggs (19531960), David Penrose Buckson (1960-1961), Elbert N. Carvel (1961-1965), Charles Laymen
Terry, Jr. (1965-1969), Russell Wilber Peterson (1969-1973), Sherman W. Tribbitt (1973-1977),
Pierre S. du Pont IV (1977-1985), Michael N. Castle (1985-1992), Dale E. Wolf (1993), Thomas R.
Carper (1993-2001), and current Governor Ruth Ann Minner (2001-present). For current
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Chancery,22 3 and countless legislators, administrators, and legal
professionals. Yet one thing has stayed the same: Delaware has
preserved its preeminence in the corporate charter race. This
dominance has been shown to account for a large percentage of the
state's revenues and the ability to demand monopoly-priced franchise
taxes from large, publicly traded companies in return for its corporate
law and chancery courts. 224 Delaware's market power is further
enhanced by the failure of other states to compete vigorously for
225
Delaware's market share of corporate charters.
Professional competition is likely to be less stable than
jurisdictional competition. For example, as was seen in Table 1,
Delaware's preeminence in the bankruptcy venue race has already
begun to falter. 226 This decline results because professional
competition depends upon the personalities driving the race. In
professional competition, virtually all of the supply-side decisions are
made by individuals who enjoy some but not all of the benefits that
come from the supply of their professional services. From the
standpoint of a state like Delaware, the supply of services offered in
the context of the professional competition that characterizes
bankruptcy venue is relatively inelastic, particularly when compared
to that state's responsiveness in the corporate charter setting.
Even more important than this inelasticity of supply from the
standpoint of the state is the inelasticity of supply from the standpoint
of the professional-competitor. Professionals cannot replicate
themselves and can only work so hard. In short, the service of
particular judges, which is what bankruptcy lawyers say they want
from Delaware venue, is highly inelastic.

information,
see
The
Political
Graveyard,
Delaware
Governors,
at
http://politicalgraveyard.com/geo/DE/ofc/gov.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
223. These chancellors and vice chancellors include the following: Charles Minot Curtis
(1909-1921), Josiah Oliver Wolcott (1921-1938), William Watson Harrington (1938-1950), George
Burton Pearson, Jr. (1939-1946), Daniel F. Wolcott (1950-1951), Collins J. Seitz (1946-1966),
Howard W. Bramhall (1951-1954), William Marvel (1954.1982), Issac D. Short, 11 (1961-1973),
William Duffy (1966-1973), Grover C. Brown (1973-1985), William T. Quillen (1973-1976),
Maurice A. Hartnett, III (1976-1994), Joseph J. Longobardi (1982-1984), Carolyn Berger (19841994), Joseph T. Walsh (1984-1985), William T. Allen (1985-1997), Bernard Balick (1994-1998),
Myron T. Steele (1994.2000), and current members, Chancellor William B. Chandeler III, (1989present), and Vice Chancellors Jack B. Jacobs (1985-present), Stephen P. Lamb (1997-present),
Leo E. Strine, Jr. (1998-present), and John W. Noble (2000-present). For current information, see
Delaware Court of Chancery, Judges, at http://courts.state.de.us/chancery/judges.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2002).
224. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 175, at 1211-14.
225. Id.
226. See supra Part I.
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4. Private Goods vs. Public Goods
The relative inelasticity of supply, of professional services
highlights the fourth key difference between jurisdictional competition
and professional competition. Unlike jurisdictional competition, which
is frequently thought to produce public goods, professional competition
produces what are largely private goods. A pure "public good" is
defined by welfare economists as having an inexhaustible and
nonexclusive supply. This definition is often stretched to include goods
that have very small marginal costs. The corporate charter race, for
example, is thought to result in the generation of a widely enjoyed
public good, namely Delaware corporation law. 227 Delaware law fits

the less formal definition of a public good because it is inexhaustible,
in that the use of Delaware law by one corporation or investor does not
exhaust the supply available for others, and because the process of
making Delaware law available for some makes it available to
8
others. 22
Professional competition is not characterized by the same
generation of public goods. Only so many corporations can obtain the
benefit of Delaware bankruptcy venue. The prized judgment of Judges
Walsh and Walrath is limited to the number of cases they can hear.
This service is exhaustible, in the sense that the enjoyment of these
riches by one case deprives the supply available to others. The supply
of Delaware bankruptcy venue is also exclusive, in that the benefits of
venue are limited, in large part, to the litigants.
In summary, although Delaware has won the battle for
bankruptcy venue, its victory is less stable and defensible than the one
it won in the corporate charter race over eighty years ago. Professional
competition can be thought of as distinct from jurisdictional
competition in that it is driven by the personal interests of
professionals, rather than the joint interests of diverse actors bound
together by geographic political boundaries. The freedom from
territorial fixation creates the potential for more effective competition
between professionals than that between jurisdictions. With
professional competition, victories are more likely to be fleeting and
innovations more successfully duplicated than in jurisdictional
competition. The potential dynamism of professional competition also
reflects the inelastic nature of the supply of professional services.
These
characteristics
of professional
competition-personal
motivation, geographic flexibility, competitiveness, and public goods
227. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 182, at 1097 (citation omitted).
228. Id.
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generation-all have implications for the structure and future of our
bankruptcy system.
D. Implications of ProfessionalCompetition in Bankruptcy
The idea that federal bankruptcy judges might compete with
each other for cases despite fixed uniform compensation and an
absence of formal hierarchy suggests several possibilities for the
enhancement of bankruptcy institutions. First, the fact that
professionals compete to provide service, and that the marketplace
differentiates between them, suggests that national welfare may be
enhanced by the establishment of an "at-large" bankruptcy judiciary.
At-large bankruptcy judges might operate in a manner familiar to
private arbitrators, freed from the geographical constraints that
currently characterize bankruptcy jurisdiction. A second, and perhaps
less likely, possibility is a move toward actual jurisdictional
competition in bankruptcy, with state-based, rather than federal,
bankruptcy law and courts. Each of these possibilities will be
examined in turn.
1. At-Large "Arbitrator-like" Bankruptcy Judges
The benefits of professional competition might be enhanced by
freeing bankruptcy judges froin their geographic limitations. As has
been demonstrated above, bankruptcy venue has become quite
229
malleable since Judge Balick's ruling on domicile over a decade ago.
Credit markets, particularly for those of the largest Chapter 11
debtors, are virtually global. If the purpose of federal bankruptcy law
is to lower the cost of credit ex ante, then why should bankruptcy
venue be geographically fixed?
The most common defense of geographic fixation of bankruptcy
venue is creditor convenience. Small regional, local, or individual
creditors may be left powerless by large debtors able to finance farflung bankruptcy litigation. Geographically bound bankruptcy venue
permits small creditors the ability to assert their claims without
significant inconvenience. Creditor convenience also limits a debtor's
ability to stack the deck by traveling to a remote jurisdiction beyond
the distant cries of objecting creditors in order to gain support for an
otherwise insupportable reorganization plan.

229. See In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (Balick, B.J.)
(holding that a corporation's "residence or domicile" for purposes of bankruptcy venue is its place
of incorporation).
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These defenses of geographically based bankruptcy venue,
however, beg an important question, namely, why are professional
bankruptcy judges tied to a particular venue? All of the creditor
convenience concerns could be accommodated by a system that
brought highly prized professional judges to the most important cases.
Bankruptcy judges in such a system might operate as "at-large"
judges, "riding circuit" to hear cases on their respective dockets. In
this manner, bankruptcy judges might evolve into a hierarchy similar
to that which characterizes arbitrators and "private" judges, with the
"most professional" or "best" judges being tapped to hear the cases of
most importance for the national economy, with less important cases
placed into the competent hands of the rest of the bankruptcy bench.
Bankruptcy judges might then continue to compete with each other for
the prestige and recognition associated with the most important cases,
freed from accidents of location.
Creditor convenience concerns also ignore the current realities
of bankruptcy venue. As Enron demonstrates, bankruptcy venue can
be had just about anywhere. 230 Many of these strategic venue
decisions are made with the consent, and sometimes at the insistence,
of creditors. An at-large, arbitration-type system of allocating judicial
resources removes the pretense from the current system and taps the
competitive forces of professionals and professionalism.
One other aspect of an at-large, arbitrator-type bankruptcy
judge involves the tangible rewards for professional competition. As
the above discussion of the current system demonstrates,
professionals are driven to compete even in the absence of tangible
rewards. 231 It is possible, however, that internalization of some of the
benefits of professionalism on the bench might foster greater, more
widespread, and more dynamic competition between professionals.
Benefits might be internalized by indexing a judge's monetary
compensation to the size of the companies or cases brought before her.
As long as litigants remain free to settle upon the services of
particular judges, then at-large bankruptcy judges might operate like
private suppliers in any other market.
The market-like possibilities of at-large bankruptcy judges
raise yet another possibility: private bankruptcy judges. A system of
private bankruptcy judges, compensated as administrative expenses
in the cases before them, might sit in public courtrooms. Like private
prosecutors in the English criminal courts, these private actors might
be entrusted to discharge the public office of judging.
230. See supra Part II.C.
231. See supra Parts I-IL.
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Private judges have operated alongside the governmental civil
justice system for a range of cases, including family and commercial
disputes. 2 2 Private judiciaries that would completely displace the
governmental monopoly over the judicial function have been proposed,
but have had no operational opportunities in modern, industrialized
societies. 233 Such judiciaries, frequently referred to as "polycentric
legal systems," have been proposed in various forms but have several
common features and principles. 234 They begin with the premise that
the judicial function is a service, and one for which there is a demand
and a supply. 235 They also recognize that many of the transactional
barriers to the operation of such a system might be overcome through
advance planning and contracting. 236 If all adults were required to
select and contract with a private judicial service provider in advance,
then a tort claim, for example, could be litigated before the victim's
preselected judge, so long as a "comity" arrangement between the
tortfeasor's provider had been established in advance. 237 Polycentrists
point to private police and home security contractors as models of how
23 8
a polycentric judiciary might operate.
The most formidable impediments to the implementation of a
polycentric legal order stem from the fact that the vast majority of
disputes involve litigants whose interests are at odds with each other.
A private bankruptcy judiciary avoids this impediment, however,
because of the nature of a bankruptcy case. Unlike most property, tort,
or contract disputes, bankruptcy cases involve parties whose interests
are not necessarily at odds. Although the individual issues within a
case can be hotly contested, the overarching principle of bankruptcy,
and the principal justification for its existence, is that the claimants to
a common pool of assets have a joint interest in maximizing the value
of that pool. 239 Individual claimants might injure this joint enterprise
through short-sighted asset grabs, so bankruptcy law minimizes

232. See Steven J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration,83 MINN. L. REV. 703,1707-27 (1999).
233. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

238-97 (1998); see also Tom W. Bell, Polycentric Law, HUMANE STUD. REV., Winter 1991-92, at 1;
Randy E. Barnett, PursuingJustice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevention and the Legal
Order, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1986, at 37-47; Randy E. Barnett & Douglas
Rasmussen, The Right to Liberty in a Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1603, 1611 (2001).
234. See Bell, supra note 233, at 1.
235. See Barnett, supra note 233, at 37.
236. See Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, and Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider
Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 581-83 (1998).
237. Barnett, supra note 233, at 40.
238. Id.
239. THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 26 (1986).
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opportunities for opt-out and hold-out behavior. 240 As a result,
bankruptcy cases differ from other types of civil cases because party
interests are aligned in such a way as to render them "one party"
cases.
If the object of bankruptcy is to maximize the debtor's estate,
then a private judiciary focused upon bankruptcy cases does not suffer
the transaction cost difficulties confronted by most polycentric legal
system proposals. Private judges might report to hear cases upon a
majority or supermajority vote of claimants. Market forces would limit
their fees to a percentage of the value their oversight adds to the
common pool. Judges who gained an unsavory reputation, say, for
unfairness to small creditors or for rubber-stamping management
decisions, might undermine their prospects of hearing future cases.
Competition between private judges would ensure that each judge
would keep up with innovations in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Review of questions of law by government courts of appeal could
address concerns about departures from settled or legislated
mandatory rules.
In sum, if professionals compete in the absence of tangible
incentives and in the presence of territorial restrictions, and if this
competition produces better and more innovative judges, then perhaps
the benefits of professional competition could be maximized by lifting
the territorial limitations on bankruptcy judges. A private bankruptcy
judiciary might maximize the social benefits of professional
competition, in part, by allowing professionals to be selected and
compensated in proportion to the value that they add to the cases they
oversee.
2. Possibilities for State Law Bankruptcy
The recognition that competition for bankruptcy venue is not
jurisdictional competition raises two questions. The first question is,
"What would actual jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy look
like?" The second question is, "Would actual jurisdictional competition
in bankruptcy be better than the professional competition we
currently have?" Although political realities render such questions
academic, they are worth exploring.

240. Id.
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a. Actual JurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy
i.

State Reorganization Law

There are at least two possibilities for jurisdictional
competition in bankruptcy. One form of state-based bankruptcy law
might operate in much the same fashion as state-based corporate law
or insolvency law. A state-based discharge regime has not been
attempted since the ratification of the Constitution, with its
Bankruptcy Clause establishing bankruptcy within the purview of
Congress. 24 1 Nevertheless, many of the colonies had their own
bankruptcy regimes throughout the colonial period, and those that did
law. 242 Furthermore,
English
bankruptcy
not incorporated
reorganization law, as distinguished from the use of bankruptcy as an
insolvency regime, originated in the state courts in the latter part of
243
the nineteenth century, through the equity receivership.
Under the original equity receivership, the lead creditor,
typically a Wall Street investment banker, would orchestrate a plan of
reorganization for a large, industrial debtor. 244 The reorganization
typically left small junior creditors out in the cold, but these creditors
245
likely would have received little or nothing in a liquidation anyway.
The era of the equity receivership was characterized by competition
between state courts and innovation by legal professionals, including
lawyers and judges.
or equity
reorganization
Resurrection
of state-based
receiverships, while politically formidable, is not necessarily
impracticable. Two concerns must first be addressed. The most
important of these concerns involve questions of in rem and in
personam jurisdiction. Federal bankruptcy courts enjoy jurisdiction
over all property of a debtor, wherever situated, as long as it is within
the United States.246 Likewise, federal bankruptcy law confers in
personam jurisdiction upon a court sitting in bankruptcy over any

241. See PETER J. COLEMAN, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 17 (1974);
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 5-8 (1935).
242. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900 14 (1974).

IN

AMERICA:

INSOLVENCY,

243. See SKEEL, supra note 40, at 56-69.
244. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 73, at 921-24.
245. Id. at 931-32.

246. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (holding that "Congress intended to
grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and
expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate") (internal citations
omitted).
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party having an interest in or claim upon a debtor in bankruptcy. 247
This far-reaching jurisdiction permits federal courts sitting in
bankruptcy to make final dispositions of property and enjoin all future
claims against the debtor by operation of bankruptcy's discharge. Can
state-based bankruptcy enjoy the reach held by federal bankruptcy
law?
The answer to this question is a resounding "maybe." The most
promising avenue for addressing jurisdictional concerns runs through
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. 248 This clause
requires state courts to enforce the judgments handed down by courts
249
in sister states as though they were issued by domestic state courts.
Restructurings effected under the equity receivership enjoyed success
for decades, in part because the state courts imposing the
reorganizations were presumed to issue judgments with national
250
reach.
A second concern is the uncertainty parties would face in
determining which state's bankruptcy regime would apply. Here, one
approach is to impose upon a debtor company and its creditors the
regime enacted by the debtor's state of incorporation. Such an
approach would extend the internal-affairs doctrine that governs
corporate affairs and dissolution generally. 251 Another approach, a
variant of one advocated by Professors Rasmussen and Thomas, would
permit debtors to choose, ex ante, the state regime that would apply in
event of bankruptcy. 252 A debtor would, under this approach, stipulate
in its corporate charter or by-laws the jurisdiction that would govern
the proceedings in the event of a bankruptcy filing. 253 Potential
investors and creditors alike would then be on constructive notice of
any given debtor's bankruptcy venue, and markets could evaluate and
price these determinations accordingly.
One major criticism of such an approach is that the choice of
venue occurs at a time so much earlier than the time of filing that it

247. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, unlike its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, gives
district courts in personam as well as in rem jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
248. The United States Constitution provides as follows:
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST.
249. Id.
250. See
251. See
252. See
253. Id.

art. IV, § 1.
SKEEL, supra note 40, at 47-49.
Beveridge, supra note 168, at 702-03.
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1397.
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deprives the relevant decisionmakers-the debtor, investors, and
creditors-of the benefits of competitive innovations that might
254
change the locus of efficient reorganization in the interim.
Alternative approaches might permit frequent changes to the venue
determination, even up to the date of the filing of the petition.
Ostensibly, this system is the same that exists under the current
domicile-based venue regime in federal bankruptcy.
The competitive innovation afforded by jurisdictional
competition is perhaps the most promising aspect of state-based
bankruptcy. One state, for example, might adopt a "chameleon equity"
255
approach to insolvency, as imagined by Professor Barry Adler.
Under a chameleon equity regime, a period of corporate insolvency
would wipe out the interests of shareholders, which would be replaced
by junior debtholders. Debt would become equity, without the
involvement of courts, lawyers, accountants, and delays. 25 6 Another
state might adopt an auction approach, as advocated by Professor
Douglas Baird. 257 Companies filing for bankruptcy would find their
businesses up for sale to the highest bidder, which might be a
consortium of current creditors who buy the firm in its entirety, or
scavengers who grab assets piecemeal. 258 Still other states might enact
the "options method" of reorganization favored by Professor Lucian
Bebchuck, where junior interests are given options to buy out more
senior interests if they view the value of the firm as exceeding their
claims. 259 In short, academic debates over the most efficient
reorganization schemes would no longer be academic. The laboratory
of the states could put them to the test.
ii. State Contract Law: Private Reorganization
A second form of state-based bankruptcy might operate in a
more diffuse manner than current federal bankruptcy law. A statebased regime of corporate reorganization that operated entirely
through the state contract law might prove as effective as a federal or
state reorganization scheme. In fact, much of the debate over the last
decade concerning corporate reorganization can be recharacterized as
one of tension between federal bankruptcy law and private,
contractual corporate restructurings under state contract law.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Skeel, supra note 71, at 26.
See Adler, supra note 4, at 312, 323-33.
Id.
See Baird, supra note 4, at 633.
Id.
Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 789.
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Contractualism in corporate bankruptcy is most closely
associated with the work of Professors Robert Rasmussen, Randall
Thomas, Douglas Baird, and Alan Schwartz. 260 Contractualists believe
the most effective way to handle the common-pool, collective-action
problem is through contractual "workouts" between the debtor and its
26 1
creditors.
The contractualists appear to be pleased with the
Delawarization of corporate bankruptcy. 262 This pleasure is due, in no
small measure, to the fact that much of the reorganization activity in
Delaware takes place through prepackaged Chapter 11 plans. 263 These
plans reflect the prenegotiated, consensual, contractual solutions that
contractualists argue are more efficient than the cumbersome
meanderings of a traditional Chapter 11 proceeding. 264 If debtors and
creditors choose Delaware as the locus of reorganization and choose
consensual prepackaged plans, then the choice of Delaware
presumptively reflects a lowered cost of credit ex ante and is therefore
desirable. The bankruptcy court merely adds the force of a court order
to agreements that would otherwise be enforceable under ordinary
notions of contract breach and reigns in potential free riders or
holdouts. Delaware bankruptcy is efficient in this view because
Delaware judges do not make asset deployment decisions; they leave
those decisions to the experience and business acumen of debtors and
creditors.
Recent musings by contractualists have suggested that
prepacks are only a first step in the right direction. 2 65 To further
enhance social welfare, another step might be to align bankruptcy
proceedings with the equity receiverships of the nineteenth century.266
Under the equity receivership, a single lead creditor coordinated a
corporate restructuring. 267 The effort was largely consensual, utilizing
a state court's equitable powers to solve the commons tragedy 268 and
260. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 73, at 956-58; Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A
Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1812 (1998); David A.
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 471, 473 n.1 (1994).
261. See Schwartz, supra note 260, at 1809.
262. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 22, at 283.
263. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1397.
264. See id. at 1359 n.7.
265. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 216.
266. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 73, at 921-24.
267. Id. at 922.
268. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354
(1967) (explaining that common ownership of a resource leads owners to tragically waste the
resource even when doing so undermines the collective interests of the common owners).
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holdout and free-rider problems. 26 9 While these solutions generally
satisfied the parties involved, they raised alarm among the general
public over lack of government oversight of large companies in
industries vital to the economic lifeblood of the nation. 270 When
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was swept into office on a wave of
populism, New Dealer William 0. Douglas, a former Yale law
professor, took the helm of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and pushed through the Chandler Act, essentially capturing the
27 1
corporate reorganization business for the federal bankruptcy courts.
The equity receivership was dead. Contractualists appear to be
pressing for a resurrection.
b. Is Actual JurisdictionalCompetition in Bankruptcy Desirable?
Whether actual jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy takes
the form of equity receiverships or contractual workouts, the question
remains whether actual jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy
would be desirable. The answer to that question depends, in turn,
upon the objectives of a bankruptcy system. If the purpose of a
bankruptcy system is to reduce the cost of credit ex ante, and if this
reduction can be accomplished most efficiently through competition
and choice, then perhaps a state-based bankruptcy system that
capitalizes on jurisdictional as well as professional competition might
advance social welfare beyond the capabilities of the current structure
of federal bankruptcy institutions. Some commentators are reluctant
to agree that reduction of credit costs is the central function of a
bankruptcy system. These commentators, most notably Professors
Karen Gross at New York Law School, Elizabeth Warren at Harvard
Law School, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook and Theresa Sullivan, both
of the University of Texas Law School, believe that one central
purpose of a bankruptcy system is to provide a social safety net,
helping to ease transitions for workers and communities affected by
failed companies, as well as individuals and families caughit up in
financial misfortune. 272 The central concern of the progressive safetynet position is that venue choice is the prerogative of managers,

269. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 73, at 931.
270. See SKEEL, supra note 40, at 42-51.
271. Id. at 119-27.
272. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 21 (1997); see also THERESA SULLIVAN ET
AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 4 (1989) [hereinafter As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS];
THERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 22 (2000).
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creditors, and investors. 73 In the search for bankruptcy efficiencies,
workers ancd communities are voiceless.274
Social safety-net concerns need not undermine state law-based
reorganization initiatives, however. States have historically operated
as primary providers of social safety nets and currently fulfill that
responsibility with welfare systems, consumer-protection laws, and
other mechanisms designed to protect and promote the quality of life
enjoyed by their residents. In fact, jurisdictional competition in many
of these arenas is credited with the spread of socially beneficial legal
innovations, including workers' compensation law. 275 Jurisdictional
competition in the realm of corporate reorganization law and the
efficiencies and innovation that it might promote could protect worker
and community interests more effectively and efficiently than indirect
efforts through federal bankruptcy law.
Professional competition may be stifled, however, in any move
toward jurisdictional competition in bankruptcy. This result may be
inevitable given the structure of the federal bankruptcy system, with
its national uniformity that permits us to witness professional
competition. A move toward state-based reorganization might make
the actions of judges and other decisionmakers more opaque to
observers seeking to make the comparisons that fuel competition
between judicial professionals. Selection of the relevant judiciary is
also likely to differ from state to state, displacing the current slate of
professionals from their insular fourteen-year terms and possibly
replacing them with judges elected every two or four years. 276 Statebased reorganization law raises a type of Heisenberg uncertainty 277:
Will state-based law introduce jurisdictional competition at the
expense of professional competition, competition which may only exist
because of the current laboratory in which we observe it? If such a
tradeoff does occur, then it may not be worth the effort. We need to
273. As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 272, at 21.
274. GROSS, supra note 272, at 6.
275. See, e.g., JACK B. HOOD & BENJAMIN A. HARDY, JR., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS IN A NUTSHELL 823-27 (1984) (stating that Maryland was the first
state to pass a workers' compensation act in 1902). But see WILLIAM R. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 32 (1932) (explaining that the federal government, which enacted a
workers' compensation system in 1908, was the first governmental entity in the United States to
do so).
276. States like Illinois, for example, hold retention elections every two years for interim
judges appointed by the chief judges of the various state court districts and contested elections
for state court judgeships every four years. See ILL. CONST., art. 6, § 12 (1970).
277. The Heisenberg uncertairity principle states that first, any observation necessarily
requires intervention into the sy, cm being studied, and second, that we can never be certain
that the intervention did not cha,..,e the system in some unknown way. WERNER HEISENBERG,
PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE RE\OLUTION IN MODERN SCIENCE 47-48 (1958).
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learn much more about, professional competition before we can know
whether we would want jurisdictional competition to displace it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last twelve years, large, public corporations have
increasingly chosen to file petitions for reorganization in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. This recent
development has fueled a debate regarding forum-shopping in
bankruptcy, with the familiar "race to the bottom" and "race to the
top" arguments that characterized the corporate charter competition
won by Delaware more than eighty years ago. "Delaware Skeptics," on
the "race to the bottom" side, ascribe Delaware's leadership in the race
for bankruptcy venue to pernicious activities by fee-hungry debtors'
counsel and rubber-stamping Delaware bankruptcy judges. "Delaware
Enthusiasts," on the other hand, attribute the rise of Delaware as a
product of the value-enhancing efficiency of the judges on the
Delaware bankruptcy bench.
This Article presents explanations for the Delawarization of
corporate bankruptcy, as articulated by over thirty lawyers and more
than twenty judges from around the country with various levels of
involvement in this development. Lawyers suggested several factors
that lead to the choice of Delaware in the bankruptcy venue
determination, including predictability, legal precedent, judicial
sophistication, geographic convenience, and the realization of
attorneys' fees. Judges attributed much of the growth to a perception
that judges around the country were less predictable than the
Delaware judges. They also attributed choice of Delaware to the
willingness of the Delaware judges to entertain an ever-expanding
docket, "psychic income" from overseeing important cases, and
Delaware judges' widely recognized professionalism and work ethic.
The evidence assembled here suggests that the Delawarization
of bankruptcy is a competition between judges and not jurisdictions.
This competition is the product of a confluence of several factors,
including the professionalization of the federal bankruptcy bench,
Delaware's preeminence in the jurisdictional competition for corporate
charters, and pressure emanating from Delaware's legal culture. This
pressure results in what this Article calls "professional competition," a
competition that fails to conform to Tiebout competition in the classic
sense, but has consequences for traditional forms of jurisdictional
competition.
Professional competition differs from its jurisdictional
counterpart in several respects. First, professional competition
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depends on personalities rather than institutions. As a result, it is
suited for the advancement of personal interests but is a blunt
instrument in the pursuit of joint interests. Second, professional
competition enjoys a relative freedom from the geographic limitations
associated with jurisdictional competition. Third, professional
competition, because it is so dependent upon individual professionals,
is likely to be more dynamic and less stable than jurisdictional
competition. Delaware's eleven-year reign as the king of corporate
bankruptcy venue has already begun to wane, unlike its eighty-year
dominance of the corporate charter race. Fourth, professional
competition results in the provision of private goods, unlike the public
goods thought to be generated by jurisdictional competition.
These differences between professional competition and
jurisdictional competition are not mere curiosities. Rather, they
suggest reforms significantly different than those proposed by
Delaware's harshest critics. Instead of the elimination of Delaware
bankruptcy venue, the existence of professional competition between
bankruptcy judges suggests that bankruptcy judges should be freed
from current geographic constraints. It also suggests that professional
competition may be a more desirable mechanism for producing the
legal innovation once thought to be the exclusive product of
jurisdictional competition. Finally, the existence of professional
competition raises questions about the compatibility of the two forms
of competition. Jurisdictional competition may actually stifle or limit
the fruits of professional competition, rather than supplement them.
Only further study of professional competition can tell us whether we
ought to prefer it to its more familiar jurisdictional rival.
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Appendix
Open Letter from Judge Peter J. Walsh to the
Delaware Bankruptcy Bar
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Judge Peter J. Walsh
824 Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
(302) 573-6272
April 2, 1998
RE: First-Day DIP Financing Orders
Dear Delaware Bankruptcy Counsel:
This is a follow-up to our session of March 11, 1998, where, at
the prompting of Judge McKelvie, we discussed the need for improving
the DIP financing orders being submitted at first-day hearings. At
that meeting, I gave a number of examples of provisions in several
orders that I thought were either unnecessary, overreaching, or just
plain wrong. In an effort to improve the content of first-day DIP
financing orders, I volunteered to comment in writing on the forms
and to identify a number of terms or provisions in those orders that I
believe should be avoided. The following items, in no particular order
of priority (except as to the first item), are not intended as immutable
rules that I have on the matter, and certainly I have no authority to
speak for the other judges on these matters, but I thought if we could
shorten and eliminate some of the more objectionable features of
proposed first-day DIP financing orders, we could improve the firstday proceeding. Needless to say, however, I think it is not practicable
to have a blanket set of prohibitions, given the numerous variations in
the lending arrangements and the prepetition relationships between
the debtor and the lender(s).
1. Many of the proposed orders are just too verbose and cover
unnecessary matters. It is not necessary for the order to recite, even in
summary fashion, the major provisions of the loan documents. For
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example, the following is a portion of a paragraph included in a recent
DIP financing order, which obviously paraphrases what the loan
document says on this particular matter: All advances and other
extensions of credit and financial accom[m]odations shall be made
solely on the terms and conditions of, and pursuant to, the
Postpetition Loan Agreement and the other Postpetition Loan
Documents, shall be evidenced by the Lenders' books and records, and
shall be due and payable as provided in those agreements. The
Lenders shall have no commitment to make any advances or other
extensions of credit or financial accom[m]odations, and may, at any
time, refuse to make advances, extensions of credit, or other financial
accom[mjodations and may exercise their rights and remedies
pursuant to the Prepetition Loan Agreement, the Postpetition Loan
Agreement, and this Order upon an Event of Default as provided in
the Postpetition Loan Agreement, including, without limitation, the
incurrence by the Debtors of any liabilities above those approved in
the "Budget" (as defined herein) appended hereto as Exhibit B. If the
DIP financing order authorizes the debtor to enter into the financing
pursuant to the loan documents, it is simply not necessary for the
order to restate a lot of the major terms of the financing. (Indeed, most
of the above-quoted statement states the obvious for the type of loan
transaction that we see on the first day.) The motion itself should spell
out the terms that are essential to an understanding of the deal:
maximum borrowing, interim borrowing limit, borrowing conditions
(e.g., percentage of inventory value), interest rate, maturity, events of
default, use of funds limitations, collateral, and/or priority, etc.; but I
do not see that it is necessary to get into a lot of details on these in the
order. Of course, the order should identify those sections of the
Bankruptcy Code designed to protect the estate and/or creditors
generally that are being limited or abridged in any manner by the
terms of the loan documents.
2. Do not incorporate into the order specific sections of the loan
documents without a statement of the section's import. In a recent
case the proposed order contained a decretal paragraph regarding
events of default that specifically referenced about a dozen particular
sections of the loan agreement and tied them into the issue covered by
the decretal paragraph. It is simply unrealistic to expect that I can
fully read and digest all the provisions of the loan documents in the
few hours those documents are in my possession leading up to the
first-day hearing. Reciting specific ties between the terms of the order
and particular terms or provisions of the loan agreement is something
that
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under most circumstances on the first day I cannot comfortably
append my signature to.
3. Given the limited amount of time we have to review the
first-day motions prior to the hearing and given the substantial
amount of paperwork presented, particularly the DIP financing
motion with the loan documents and the related order, it is not
realistic to have a provision in the order that recites that the Court
has "examined" all the loan documents, or that the Court "approves"
all the terms and provisions of the loan documents, or language of
similar import. An egregious example in this regard reads: "The
provisions of the Postpetition Loan Agreement and other Postpetition
Loan Documents are hereby approved and by this reference
incorporated herein as a part of this Order." Remember, the Court is
authorizing the debtor to borrow money on basic terms that appear
reasonable under the expedited circumstances; it is not placing its
imprimatur on the multiple terms and conditions of the loan
documents.
4. Many of the proposed orders contain lengthy recitations of
findings that are preambles to the decretal portion of the order. Given
the fact that at most first-day hearings only the debtor is heard, it is
somewhat presumptuous, and in many cases unduly aggressive, for
counsel to hand up an order that sets forth detailed, and in many
cases nonessential, findings by the Court regarding prepetition deals,
relationships, and understandings of the parties. Most of these
findings are based on lengthy recitations in the motion papers. It
seems to me, given the limited nature of the first-day hearing, that
most of these "findings" would better be recited under a heading of
"stipulations" between the debtor and the lender. Please note, if the
stipulation approach is used, do not put further back in the order a
decretal statement that says something to the effect that all the terms
and provisions of the subject order constitute an order of the Court. By
its nature the order will be acknowledging the stipulations, and of
course, appropriate court findings will be a part of the order.
0
5. The order should not state that parties in interest have been
given "sufficient and adequate notice" of the motion. Nine times out of
ten this is simply not true. Rule 4001(c)(2) contemplates an expedited
hearing with little or no notice (at least not the type of notice that
would be sufficient to prepare for an effective participation by third
parties). Consequently, the order should simply recite that the hearing
is being held pursuant to the authorization of Rule 4001(c)(2) and
recite to whom and when the notice was given.
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6. Given the limited nature of the hearing on the first day, the
findings that are necessary for the § 364(e) protection afforded the
lender can appropriately be expressed in language such as: "Based on
the record presented to the Court by the Debtor, it appears that . ..

."

7. Absent exigent circumstances, neither the loan documents
nor the order should give the lender a lien position on avoidance
actions.
8. While, in order to give the prepetition/postpetition creditor
protection typically demanded, it is appropriate for the debtor to
and
perfection,
enforceability,
the
validity,
acknowledge
nonavoidability of the prepetition indebtedness and perhaps waive
any lender liability claims, this provision should preferably be in the
form of a stipulation and should be limited to the debtor so that it is
not binding on the estate, the committee, or a trustee. As discussed
below, a time limit with respect to nondebtor challenges to the
prepetition secured position may be appropriate.
9. Where a DIP financing facility includes the use of the
prepetition creditors' cash collateral, adequate protection in the form
of a substitute lien on postpetition collateral is appropriate to the
extent there is a diminution in the value of the prepetition collateral,
but such a provision should not include language such as the
following: "[T]he Debtors' use of cash collateral pursuant to this Order
or otherwise is hereby deemed to result in a dollar-for-dollar decrease
in the value of the Prepetition Collateral. ..

."

10. The debtor's obligation to reimburse the lender for costs
and expenses, including attorneys' fees, etc., should be expressed in
terms of "reasonable" costs and expenses and such reimbursement
obligation should not apply to the lender's defense to challenges by a
committee to the lender's prepetition security position.
11. Carveouts for professional fees should not be limited to the
debtor's professionals, but should include the professionals employed
by any official committee. While the carveout for professionals of any
official committee may appropriately exclude work related to the
prosecution of an objection to the prepetition secured position of the
lender, that exclusion should not encompass any prechallenge
investigative work by the professionals.
12. The carveout for committee professionals and the limited
period to challenge the lender's prepetition secured position is
important. In my view it is the price of admission to the bankruptcy
court to obtain the benefits of preserving the assets of the estate,
which preservation typically first benefits secured parties.
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13. The period of time during which the creditors' committee
should have the right to challenge the lenders' prepetition position
should generally be at least sixty days from the appointment of the
committee. Unless the case is on a fast track, this period should be
ninety days.
14. The following provision is patently objectionable: Nothing
contained in this Order shall be deemed a finding with respect to
adequate protection (as that term is described in Section 361 of the
Code) of the interest of the Lenders in the Prepetition Collateral, but
shall [sic] the Lenders' and security interests in the Prepetition
Collateral require adequate protection, Lenders shall be deemed to
have requested and shall be deemed to have been granted such
adequate protection as of the Petition Date or such later date when
such liens or security interests first were not adequately protected.
15. The following provision is also patently objectionable:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Order or
in any of the Postpetition Agreements, the commitment of the Lenders
to make loans, extend credit, and grant other financial
accommodations to the Debtors shall terminate immediately and
automatically, without notice of any kind, upon the institution by any
person or entity of any action seeking to challenge the validity or
priority of (or to subordinate) any of the Lenders' liens or security
interests on any of the Prepetition Collateral.
16. I know of no basis for including in a financing order a
finding (recently proposed) such as the following: "The Debtor's other
secured creditor(s) is/are adequately protected from any adverse
consequences which might result from the consummation of the
proposed post-petition secured financing between the Debtor and
Lender."
17. In reciting the protection afforded the lender by § 364(e),
verbose and redundant provisions such as the following are to be
avoided. Furthermore, in the following quoted material the
underscored language suggests to me that prepetition debt was
intended to be afforded the § 364(e) protection. No such effect would be
proper. If any or all of the provisions of this Order or the DIP
Financing Agreement are hereafter modified, vacated or stayed by
subsequent order of this Court or by any other court, such stay,
modification, or vacation shall not affect the validity of any debt to
Lender that is or was incurred pursuant to this Order or that is or was
incurred prior to the effective date of such stay, modification, or
vacation, or the validity and enforceability of any lien, security
interest or priority authorized or created by this Order or the DIP
Financing Agreement and notwithstanding such stay, modification, or
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vacation, any obligations of the Debtor pursuant to this Order or the
DIP Financing Agreement arising prior to the effective date of such
stay, modification or vacation shall be governed in all respects by the
original provisions of this Order and the DIP Financing Agreement,
and the validity of any such credit extended or lien granted pursuant
to this Order and the DIP Financing Agreement is subject to the
protections afforded under 11 U.S.C. § 364(e).
18. Provisions that operate expressly or as a practical matter to
divest the debtor, or any other party in interest, of any discretion in
the formulation of a plan are not viewed with favor. I believe the
lender can appropriately protect itself without attempting to dictate
what may happen with respect to a plan. For example, the lender can
certainly include a loan provision calling for repayment in full on the
plan's effective date.
19. I often find that the record established at the hearing,
either by affidavit or live testimony, is rather thin relative to the
detailed findings that the Court is called upon to make. It is important
that the affidavit or the live witness (either by testimony or, if
appropriate, by proffer) offered in support of the motion be specific and
complete regarding the findings required with respect to § 364(c) and
(e) and Rule 4001(c)(2).
20. The lifting of the § 362 automatic stay upon the event of a
default should be conditioned upon providing three to five business
days' notice to the debtor, the U.S. Trustee and any official committee.
21. The order should be worded in a manner that makes it
clear that, whatever the terms of the interim order, the Court is not
precluded from entering a final order containing provisions
inconsistent with or contrary to any of the terms of the interim order,
subject, of course, to the lender's § 364(e) protection with respect to
monies advanced during the interim period. Just by way of example,
should the Court deem it appropriate, given a strong showing at the
first-day hearing, to allow a waiver of § 506(c), if the subsequently
appointed committee presents a persuasive argument, the Court
should revisit the matter and be guided by what it hears at the final
hearing. The items discussed above are not intended to be a complete
list of the matters that need to be addressed on the issue of first-day
DIP financing orders. For the most part, they are derived from the
latest four or five first-day DIP financing orders that I have had before
me. If I were to go back over the last few years and review other such
orders, I am sure that I could pick out additional provisions that could
be considered objectionable. In any event, I hope that this
communication will serve to give counsel sufficient incentive to make
the proposed DIP financing orders more palatable while at the same
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time preserving those elements of the orders that the lending
institutions reasonably believe are essential. Perhaps further dialogue
on the matter would be appropriate at a gathering similar to that of
the March 11 session.
Very truly yours,
Peter J. Walsh
PJW: vw
cc:

Chief Judge Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
Judge Sue L. Robinson
Judge Roderick R. McKelvie
Patricia A. Staiano, United States Trustee

